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C O M P L I A N C E W I T H T H E 
A C C O U N T I N G R E Q U I R E M E N T S O F T H E 
F O R E I G N C O R R U P T P R A C T I C E S A C T 
• The law's title is a misnomer- it significantly 
impacts all companies, domestic as well as 
international, and especially public companies. 
• Compliance places added responsibilities on 
management, the board of directors and the 
audit committee. 
• Here's a review of the law-and 
recommendations for obtaining effective 
compliance. 
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Summary, and a Plan of Action 
How a publicly-held business is controlled and 
keeps its records are now matters of legal 
compulsion, with fines and jail sentences for 
offenders. These are probably the most significant 
facts of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 
1977 (the Act)—yet most of its publicity has 
dealt with the penalties for bribes of foreign 
officials. 
Perhaps more significant in the long run than 
possible fines and jail terms is the possibility of 
misguided and unintended use of the Act by 
regulatory agencies. A number of individual 
allegations could devolve to a set of requirements 
that would hamstring publicly-held businesses. 
Yet responsible and timely action by business, 
professional and regulatory leaders, in a coopera-
tive effort, can attain the purposes of the Act 
without needlessly rigid rules. 
The Act says, broadly: 
• Bribes and questionable conduct must stop. 
• Funds for bribes and questionable financial 
activities must be unavailable, and steps must 
be taken to assure that unavailability. 
• The steps that constitute companies' internal 
accounting and record keeping systems must 
be examined and almost invariably corrected 
where material weaknesses are found. 
The Act applies* through two of its sections, 
Accounting Standards and Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices by Issuers, to every company, domestic or 
foreign, subject to the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934. 
The Act expects management to be aware, to 
make judgments, to choose, and to take adequate 
steps to address deficiencies. Management can 
assume, if it wishes, that no action is required 
—that its responsibilities have not changed, that 
there are no new obligations. But wishes do not 
eliminate risks. And we see a new connection. 
What was conceptual, ethereal, a tenet of faith, 
has been mandated by Congress and is now 
law—to be interpreted, perhaps misunderstood 
and definitely enforced. 
Much of the interpretation and enforcement of 
the Act will deal not with its antibribery provi-
sions (which are relatively specific) but with its 
"Accounting Standards Provisions" (which are 
not). These provisions were drawn from auditors' 
pronouncements and will be quite difficult to 
apply. The writers of the Act recognized that 
judgments and estimates are needed to determine 
the degree of internal accounting control and 
record keeping that is appropriate for any com-
pany, and they put that burden on management. 
A prudent course for management—given the 
regulatory authorities' assigned responsibility, 
and mindful of the righteous, inquisitorial envi-
ronment in which the law was adopted—involves 
action. Companies affected should make a sys-
tematic and documented effort to review the 
adequacy of record keeping and internal controls 
and should make any improvements that business 
judgment dictates are advisable. 
If a company's systems provide reasonable 
assurance of achieving the objectives of internal 
accounting control, and if a company's systems 
have been modified to recognize the specifics and 
the intent of the Act, then we believe manage-
ment has demonstrated compliance with the Act. 
This is not to say that an actual violation of the 
Act will not be alleged, but rather that manage-
ment has exercised due care in attempting to 
meet a responsibility amidst significant and valid 
differences of opinion as to how to comply. 
Given very few authoritative regulatory 
guidelines, management will find that internal 
and outside auditors can be especially helpful. 
The board and the audit committee will find that 
in setting appropriate policy, as in monitoring 
progress, the independent accountant will be an 
indispensible aid. And we, as study of this 
booklet will confirm, stand ready and able to 
assist. 
*And it applies to practically everybody else through a 
section labeled Foreign Corrupt Practices by Domestic 
Concerns, including 
• any individual who is a citizen, national or resident of the 
U.S. 
• any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock com-
pany, business trust, unincorporated organization or sole 
proprietorship that: a) has its principal place of business in 
the U.S., or b) is organized under the laws of a state, 
territory, possession or commonwealth of the U.S. 
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Part I 
The Law and its Significance 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, signed in 
December, 1977, and reprinted in pertinent part 
within Appendix A, grew from fertile soil 
—including the following: 
• The use of corporate resources for bribery of 
foreign officials and for domestic political 
contributions, as investigated by the Office of 
the Watergate Special Prosecutor and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
Some of these payments were illegal at the 
time, others were at least questionable. Many 
were made through "off-the-books" bank ac-
counts and other methods that circumvented 
internal accounting control systems. 
• The findings and recommendations of the 
SEC's "Report on Questionable and Illegal 
Corporate Payments and Practices," issued to 
the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs Committee May 12, 1976. The SEC 
recommended that Congress enact legislation 
to improve the accuracy of corporate books 
and records. 
• The hearings on illegal and questionable busi-
ness payments conducted by the Senate Bank-
ing, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee. 
This committee also proposed legislation, part 
of which was incorporated in the Act. 
SYNOPSIS OF THE ACT 
The Act contains three sections relevant to this 
discussion: 
—Accounting Standards 
—Foreign Corrupt Practices by Issuers 
—Foreign Corrupt Practices by Domestic 
Concerns 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices sections deal 
primarily with bribes, questionable conduct, and 
stopping same. Much of what was questionable is 
now specifically illegal. While the antibribery 
provisions of the Act are relatively clear, the 
rest—most notably the "Accounting Standards" 
provisions—are cloudy, and will be difficult to 
interpret, apply, and comply with. Our interpreta-
tion of these provisions, and how to comply with 
them, are the ingredients of this booklet. 
If your company is subject to the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, the Accounting Standards 
Provisions of the Act require that you keep, in 
reasonable detail, "books, records, and accounts" 
which accurately and fairly reflect the company's 
transactions and dispositions of assets; your com-
pany must also maintain a system of internal 
accounting controls providing "reasonable assur-
ances" that: 
"(i) transactions are executed in accordance 
with managment's general or specific authoriza-
tion; 
"(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary 
(I) to permit preparation of financial statements 
in conformity with generally accepted account-
ing principles or any other criteria applicable to 
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such statements, and (II) to maintain account-
ability for assets; 
"(iii) access to assets is permitted only in 
accordance with management's general or 
specific authorization; and 
"(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is 
compared with the existing assets at reasonable 
intervals and appropriate action is taken with 
respect to any differences." 
Record Keeping Requirements 
The intent of the Act's record keeping systems 
requirement is to— 
• Enable preparation of appropriate external 
financial statements, and 
• Prevent or signal illegal payments so that 
senior management and the board of directors 
or its audit committee can take appropriate 
action. 
This last requirement is clearly indicated in the 
Conference Report1 that says: 
" . . . the issuer's records should reflect 
transactions in conformity with generally 
accepted methods of recording economic 
events and effectively prevent off-the-books 
slush funds and payments of bribes." 
The Conference Report also recognizes that 
significant amounts of judgment are required in 
attempts to comply, and that perfection is unat-
tainable. For example, the same part of the 
Conference Report says: 
"The House receded to the Senate with an 
amendment requiring such books, records 
and accounts to be made and maintained 
accurately and fairly 'in reasonable detail'. 
The conference committee adopted the 'in 
reasonable detail' qualification to the accu-
rate and fair requirement in light of the 
concern that such a standard, if unqualified, 
might connote a degree of exactitude and 
precision which is unrealistic." 
In considering compliance with the Act, both 
Congress's intent and the concept of reasonable-
ness should be applied in determining the action 
to be taken.2 
Despite the structure of the law, it is critical to 
recognize that financial record keeping is not 
truly separable from the internal accounting 
systems that generate the records. Therefore, a 
plan of action to demonstrate compliance with 
the record keeping requirements of the Act must 
consider a company's internal control system and 
especially in te rna l accounting controls— 
acceptable record keeping is rarely attainable 
without acceptable internal accounting controls. 
Internal—and Internal Accounting—Control 
Internal control is essentially organization and 
procedures—the nervous system that activates 
overall operating policies and keeps a business 
within practical performance ranges. Every busi-
ness has it, however unsophisticated. Each system 
of internal control, notwithstanding its superficial 
resemblance to common patterns of organization 
and management, is unique. It includes people 
with varying authorities and capacities of supervi-
sion and with varying abilities to delegate or 
assume authority. 
" In a corporation, internal control com-
mences with the . . . enforcement of top 
policies established by boards of directors 
and continues down through the organiza-
tional structure, taking form in the develop-
ment and operation of management policies, 
administrative regulations, manuals, direc-
tives, and decisions; internal auditing; inter-
nal check; reporting; employee training and 
participation."3 
Internal accounting control must be defined 
more narrowly. Auditors, whose primary respon-
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sibility is to examine and report on financial 
representations of others, have sought those 
aspects of a company's internal control system 
that could affect the auditor's examination (see 
(i)—(iv), on pages 2 and 3). This we define as the 
internal accounting control system. While inher-
ently subjective, it is an improved formulation of 
objectives (for organizations and procedures) 
from the auditor's perspective. These objectives, 
as well as the manner in which they were 
developed and are used by the auditors, are 
described in pronouncements by the AICPA.4 
They must be understood because the writers of 
the Act 's Accounting Standards Provisions 
specifically selected the AICPA's language 
defining internal accounting control. 
THE SEC VIEW ON ENFORCEMENT 
Two months after adoption of the Act, the 
SEC explained its responsibilities for enforce-
ment as follows:5 
"The legislative history of the Act reflects 
that the Commission's enforcement respon-
sibilities extend to conducting investigations, 
bringing civil injunctive actions, commencing 
administrative proceedings if appropriate, 
including public or private disciplinary pro-
ceedings pursuant to Rule 2(e) of the 
Commission's Rules of Practice, and refer-
ring cases to the Justice Department for 
criminal prosecution where warranted, just 
as the Commission currently does with re-
spect to its existing responsibilities under the 
federal securities laws. In addition, as is true 
with respect to violations of other provisions 
of the Securities Exchange Act, controlling 
persons of an issuer may be liable for 
violations of the new requirements, and a 
negligence standard will govern civil injunc-
tive actions brought to enforce the Act. The 
legislative history of the Act also contem-
plates that private rights of action properly 
could be implied under the Act on behalf of 
persons who suffer injury as a result of 
prohibited corporate bribery." 
In a report to Congress on July 1, 1978 the 
SEC6 said— 
" . . . Along with prohibiting companies from 
engaging in certain corrupt practices with 
respect to foreign officials, the Act . . . 
require[s] reporting companies to make and 
keep accurate books and records and to 
establish and maintain a system of internal 
accounting controls which meet certain ob-
jectives. 
"Although rules have not yet been pro-
posed, the Commission is likely to require, . . 
. a representation that an issuer's system of 
internal accounting controls is in compliance 
with the provisions of the Act. This could be 
accomplished through a representation from 
management that the issuer's system of 
internal accounting controls meets the objec-
tives set out in the Act, together with an 
opinion of the independent public account-
ant as to management's representation or 
through an opinion, similar to management's 
representation described above, from the 
issuer's independent public accountant 
"Finally, the Commission has pending rule 
proposals which would supplement certain of 
the provisions of the Act. These rules, if 
adopted, would make it unlawful for any 
person to falsify corporate books and records 
and for any officer, director, or shareholder 
of a publicly-owned company to mislead an 
accountant in connection with his examina-
tion of corporate financial statements. . . ." 
Consequences 
Penalties for violations of the Accounting 
Standards Provisions of the Act are limited to 
$10,000 for companies and $10,000 plus 5 years 
imprisonment for company officials. Penalties for 
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violating the corrupt practices provisions (on 
influencing foreign governmental decisions) pro-
vide for $1,000,000 fines for companies and 
$10,000 fines and 5 years imprisonment for 
company officials. Further, any fines imposed on 
individuals may not be paid directly or indirectly 
by the company. 
There are of course other implications— 
economic, social, and political—but they are not 
the burden of this text. Management, however, 
must not lose sight of the changing environment 
in which business must operate. 
UNCERTAIN RESPONSIBILITIES 
That major uncertainties are implicit in the 
Accounting Standards Provisions of the Act 
comes clear from the following items: 
• The SEC brought the first court action in 
March 1978, charging that a company 
(Aminex) and certain of its officers had vio-
lated the Act's Accounting Standards Provi-
sions. Yet no government rules or guidelines 
on how the Act should be applied have been 
issued.7 Unless general guidelines are de-
veloped, determining whether individuals and 
companies have complied with the Act may 
have to wait until the provisions of the Act are 
applied and interpreted in specific administra-
tive and judicial proceedings of alleged wrong-
doing. This could prove a long, tedious and 
painful process. 
• Internal accounting control objectives under 
the Act are excerpted from professional 
quidelines prepared by and for auditors in 
determining audit scope, and not from infor-
mation prepared to define the responsibilities 
of companies subject to the Act. Just how 
should guidance prepared for outside auditors 
be interpreted by management in meeting the 
requirements of the Act? 
• Precedents are not available as to what indi-
vidual companies are doing about their record 
keeping and internal accounting control sys-
tems; and each company's uniqueness will 
dilute the transferability of its experience to 
others. 
• The latitude that management has in comply-
ing with the Accounting Standards Provisions 
of the Act is unclear. For example, in certain 
circumstances, management may believe that 
changes in personnel will more effectively 
enhance control than additional record keep-
ing or internal accounting control systems and 
procedures. 
• The Act applies to registrants—but what about 
subsidiaries that are not registrants? And there 
is the much more difficult question of minority 
investments in other companies, especially if 
accounted for on the equity method (because 
the investor may have real influence even 
though the ownership interest is minor). 
The SEC complaint in the Aminex case does 
not allege bribes or illegal or questionable pay-
ments, but does allege violations of the Account-
ing Standards Provisions of the Act because of 
fraudulent activities concealed by false entries on 
the company's books and records. If this com-
plaint reflects the Commission's intended direc-
tion, SEC application of the Act could be exten-
sive. 
These uncertainties complicate management's 
already difficult job of establishing the limits of its 
responsibilities. The role of judgment is central in 
determining what practices should be adopted. 
NEW MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES 
Since the auditor's definition of internal ac-
counting control is used in the Act for defining 
the responsibilities of management, its subjectiv-
ity and the judgments needed in applying it are 
important to an understanding of what may be 
required of managment under the Act. 
The two broad, interrelated objectives of inter-
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nal accounting control are: 
• Safeguarding assets against loss 
• Producing reliable financial records for inter-
nal use and for external reporting purposes.8 
These are elaborated into many more specific 
control objectives relating to various assets and 
transactions. Systems and procedures should pro-
vide controls for each objec t ive on a 
cost-effective basis and generally consist of com-
binations of seven elements: 
• Competent, trustworthy personnel with clear 
lines of authority and responsibility 
• Adequate segregation of duties 
• Proper procedures for authorization 
• Adequate documents and records 
• Proper procedures for record keeping 
• Physical control over assets and records 
• I n d e p e n d e n t (yet in ternal ) checks on 
performance. 
For a detailed discussion of the specific control 
objectives and each of these seven elements, see 
Part II of this booklet. 
CAN INTERNAL ACCOUNTING CONTROL 
BE REVIEWED? A N D HOW? 
The first answer is yes, and it was easy. The 
second answer is not so easy. We believe there 
are three fundamental steps management must 
take: 
• Identify business risks and related exposures 
based on an understanding of the company's 
business and transactions. 
• Describe and understand the systems used to 
process transactions, safeguard assets, and 
produce accounting reports. 
• Evaluate the systems, giving particular consid-
eration to possible material weaknesses. And 
be sure to give special attention to sensitive 
transactions even though monetary amounts 
are not significant. (For example: unusual 
bonuses to employees, unusual credits to cus-
tomers, and any large disbursements in cash.) 
Identify Business Risks and Related Exposures 
Each business enterprise is faced with an ever 
present set of risks and exposures. Among the 
many are: 
• Fraud and embezzlement 
• Statutory sanctions 
• Excessive costs/deficient revenues 
• Loss or destruction of assets 
• Competitive disadvantage 
• Erroneous record keeping 
• Unacceptable accounting 
• Business interruption 
• Erroneous management decisions 
In fact, markets may disappear, a lawsuit may 
be filed, raw material prices may increase, a plant 
may burn down—possibilities are endless. Two of 
management's primary responsibilities are to an-
ticipate these risks and to position the company 
so that the exposures can be economically 
minimized. 
In identifying risks and exposures, management 
should assume that the Act applies to all control-
led subsidiaries included in its consolidated 
financial statements. For minority investments 
accounted for on the equity method, the investor 
should obtain assurance that the investee has 
acted to demonstrate compliance with the Act. In 
some cases, it may be appropriate simply to have 
investee management confirm that they have 
taken action to comply with the Act. In other 
circumstances the investor may have to take an 
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actual role in demonstrating compliance. 
In allocating resources to specific internal 
accounting controls and record keeping proce-
dures, management should prioritize financial and 
related exposures by judging their risk of occur-
rence and possible impact on the company. 
Describe and Understand the Systems Used to 
Process Transactions 
Internal accounting controls are evaluated in 
terms of specific types of transactions and assets 
and their related specific control objectives. For 
example, specific controls should be designed to 
assure that raw materials purchased and used are 
properly recorded so that inventory accounts are 
a reasonably accurate representation of the usa-
ble items on hand. 
An understanding of internal accounting con-
trols requires a reasonably detailed description of 
the various accounting systems. To facilitate 
description, transactions are placed in natural 
groupings—called transaction cycles. Transaction 
cycles are described to show the flow of each type 
of transaction through the various functions of 
the business. The elements of internal accounting 
control (listed under New Management Objec-
tives, and discussed in Part II) should be clearly 
displayed; flowcharting is often used for this 
purpose. 
In addition to maintaining numerous transac-
tion cycles—such as sales and collections, pro-
curements and payments, payroll, and inventory 
and warehousing—most companies maintain a 
number of "corporate-level" controls. Examples 
of such controls are: an audit committee of the 
board of directors, internal audit, and a well 
defined conflict-of-interest policy. Additional ex-
amples are given in Part II. These controls are 
particularly important for larger companies; they 
enable management to assure that detailed sys-
tems are designed, maintained and functioning 
properly. 
Evaluate the Systems 
Do the systems adequately meet their stated 
objectives and minimize the exposures identified 
by management? If they do, are the system's 
costs commensurate with benefits, or can they be 
reduced without reducing control? And, if control 
is not being accomplished, are the weaknesses 
material, separately or in the aggregate? These 
are the questions that must be answered in 
evaluating systems of internal accounting control. 
When auditors evaluate a company's system of 
internal accounting control, they look for weak-
nesses that can make important and not trivial 
differences. Our professional definition of a 
"material weakness" is: 
" . . . a condition in which the auditor 
believes the prescribed procedures or the 
degree of compliance with them does not 
provide reasonable assurance that errors or 
irregularities in amounts that would be ma-
terial in the financial statements being au-
dited would be prevented or detected within 
a timely period by employees in the normal 
course of pe r fo rming their assigned 
functions."9 
However, as we have already seen, those 
agencies which will enforce the Act may perceive 
a material weakness differently, especially where 
a possible illegal act is involved. 
Nevertheless, the concept of reasonable assur-
ance does apply; the benefits expected to be 
derived must always exceed the expected cost of 
internal accounting controls. The benefits consist 
of reductions in the risk of failing (a) to safeguard 
assets and (b) to produce reliable financial rec-
ords. Although the cost-benefit relationship is the 
primary conceptual criterion in designing a sys-
tem of accounting control, precise measurement 
of costs and benefits is rarely possible; evaluation 
usually requires estimates and judgments by 
management. 
Continued Review and Judgment 
In addition to evaluating internal accounting 
control at a point in time, management is 
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responsible for assuring that the system functions 
as intended over time. This means that recorded 
accountability must be compared with existing 
assets and liabilities at regular intervals. Exam-
ples of procedures that can achieve such compari-
son are reconciliation of cash balances with bank 
statements, physical inspection of plant and 
equipment, and physical count of inventories. See 
Part II for more detail. 
While management styles vary, all manage-
ments judgmentally identify areas that require 
attention and determine the action to be taken. 
These judgments—as they relate to attempts to 
comply with the Act—will include consideration 
of what transactions should be more closely 
scrutinized, and what systems or areas require 
particular attention. 
Interrelating and comparing operating results is 
usually the first step; this includes: 
1) Comparing actual results to prior and ex-
pected performance, 
2) Comparing the operating and financial per-
formance statistics with those of similar com-
panies if possible, and 
3) Discussing apparent variations with those 
knowledgeable about expected or prior per-
formance levels to determine the causes. 
Ordinarily, these comparisons are made by 
product lines or segments, and concentrate on 
identifying and determining the reasons for varia-
tions. 
Such procedures highlight areas that may re-
quire action and can also indicate possible control 
or record keeping deficiencies. These approaches 
are necessary because the myriad transactions, as 
well as the size and complexity of many business 
operations, make it impossible for management 
to have a continuing working-level involvement 
with all areas of the business. In essence, because 
there is a limit on the time and money that can be 
spent for record keeping and control systems, this 
approach helps to concentrate resources where 
they can do the most good. 
Exception identification (isolating areas with 
performance different than expected) is often 
used, reporting only those items which do not 
meet a designated average or normal standard. 
This is an expeditious route to areas which may 
require additional consideration. 
A variance is chosen for additional attention 
only when a cause is sought—i.e., when manage-
ment asks "Why?" Specific studies, reports, or 
other analysis may be required, and when a cause 
is determined, additional business judgments may 
follow: 
• Has a change in the business environment 
taken place, and is it being appropriately 
signalled by the variations? 
• Should additional record keeping and systems 
controls be required? 
• Are other changes, for example, personnel 
changes, needed? 
If the variation is justified, i.e., it is based on 
underlying business or operating conditions, then 
no changes need be made in the record keeping 
or control systems—they are performing their 
functions. In this case, management must deter-
mine whether the return on investment continues 
to be, or promises to become, acceptable. 
If the variation results from deficiencies in the 
record keeping or control system, there are two 
choices, or a combination of each, namely 
whether: 
• Actions not related to accounting or record 
keeping systems should be taken; or 
• Changes should be made in the internal 
accounting control and record keeping systems. 
Consider a particular fact situation: a retail 
shoe store (like many other high-volume, low-
unit-cost activities) has significant shrinkage from 
errors in billing, mishandling of physical inven-
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tories, theft, and/or conversion by employees. For 
simplicity, although a combination of approaches 
could be appropriate, assume that the decision 
weighs two alternatives, namely: 
• Increasing the amount of record keeping and 
controls; or 
• Other changes in operating procedures. 
Increasing the amount of record keeping or 
controls would require either increased personnel 
or changes in the duties of existing personnel and 
would be justified only if losses would be reduced 
appropriately. 
On the other hand, various changes in opera-
ting procedures might be made. The decision 
could be made that each store would buy its 
inventory from the company. The manager would 
then be responsible for running the operation at a 
tolerable loss level. (Losses can be limited but 
only rarely eliminated.) Alternatively, a bonus 
system for better-than-average performance 
could accomplish the same objectives. All of 
these possible changes might achieve the 
purpose—bringing losses back into acceptable 
limits. Management has to choose the most 
effective way to reduce the shortages. In our 
hypothetical shoe store, frequent physical inven-
tories and comparisons could show whether the 
assets are safeguarded at an acceptable level. It 
appears to us that no one of the alternatives is 
preferred because of the Act, but some alternative 
must be chosen. 
WHERE THE BUCK STOPS 
Four key groups in the company should be 
involved in developing a plan to demonstrate 
active compliance with the Act—the board of 
directors or its audit committee, operating man-
agement, internal auditors, and the company's 
independent auditors. While assignment of duties 
and responsibilities among these groups will vary, 
the usual approach is outlined below. 
Role of the Board of Directors 
The board should be responsible for approving 
basic policies and for compliance oversight, not 
detailed specification and enforcement. Still, the 
primary responsibility for the sufficiency of a 
company's measures to comply with the Act lies 
here. The board of directors or its audit commit-
tee should— 
• Understand in broad outline how the record 
keeping and internal accounting control sys-
tems function and judge their sufficiency to 
achieve compliance with the Act. 
• Broadly monitor compliance, and suggest revi-
sions as needed. 
• Review existing policies and consider changes 
needed to comply with the Act; if adequate 
policies already exist, consider additional 
communication. 
• See that appropriate actions are taken con-
cerning possible violations of the Act, if any. 
Role of Operating Management 
Management's primary responsibility for main-
taining adequate and effective record keeping and 
internal accounting control systems and for 
safeguarding assets is not new. But the Act 
focuses attention on these aspects of man-
agement's responsibility in a manner that compels 
greater attention than may have been true in the 
past. In fact, operating management is responsi-
ble for detailed implementation and enforcement 
to comply with the Act. 
The board of directors or its audit committee, 
while exercising its oversight responsibilities, will 
look to operating management for information 
and to take any necessary corrective action. 
Accordingly, operating management should— 
• Identify the risks that are inherent in the 
business and the potential for errors and 
irregularities. 
• Undertake to systematically document and 
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evaluate existing record keeping practices and 
systems of internal accounting controls 
throughout the company to identify instances 
of possible nonconformity with a reasonable 
interpretation of the Act. 
• Identify and articulate the factors considered 
in assessing the practicality and cost/benefit 
aspects of suggested systems revisions. 
• Initiate applicable revisions in corporate 
policies or directives. 
Role of the Internal Auditor 
Internal auditors are an important part of 
internal control. They can, separately or with 
operating management, accomplish most of the 
above. In addition, they can: 
• Monitor compliance with existing policies of 
operating management or the board of direc-
tors. 
• Assist in special studies for operating man-
agement or the board of directors. 
Role of the Independent Auditor 
The independent auditor is not part of a 
company's internal accounting control system. He 
has a unique objective—to form an opinion on 
the financial statements. This objective causes the 
independent auditor to plan that examination to 
search for errors or irregularities that would have 
a material effect in the financial statements and to 
use due skill and care in the conduct of the 
examination. 
The adoption of the Act does not change the 
way an independent auditor goes about determin-
ing the scope of his examination. After a prelimi-
nary review of a company's internal accounting 
control systems, the auditor must decide the 
extent to which he will rely on the systems for his 
purposes. The auditor may decide that it is both 
feasible and cost effective to extensively test the 
internal accounting control systems and place 
major reliance thereon in formulating an opinion 
on the amounts in the financial statements. On 
the other hand, he may decide that it is more 
effective to perform direct extensive tests of 
documentation underlying the amounts in the 
financial statements, rather than relying on the 
internal accounting control system. In most cases, 
he will decide on a combination of reliance and 
direct testing. Accordingly, weaknesses that exist 
in a company's record keeping and internal 
accounting control systems, or portions thereof, 
may not be detected during the course of the 
independent auditor's examination because for 
valid reasons he has chosen not to rely on such 
systems. 
Currently, if aware of material weakness in 
internal accounting control, errors or ir-
regularities, or illegal acts, the independent au-
ditor is required to communicate them to 
management (at least one level above those 
involved). Depending on the significance of the 
matters reported, the board or its audit commit-
tee may also be advised. 
The independent auditor's responsibility for 
evaluating effectiveness and monitoring com-
pliance of internal accounting control systems 
parallels the responsibility of the board and its 
audit committee. The independent auditor is in a 
unique position in that he can make a "hands on" 
evaluation of the system, an opportunity not 
readily available to the board or the audit 
committee. In addition, the independent auditor 
brings the experience of similar association with 
systems of other companies to the evaluation and 
judgment problem. As a result, the independent 
auditor has a unique perspective on the com-
pany, and the board of directors and audit 
committee may find the outside auditor especially 
helpful in fulfilling their policy and oversight 
duties. In fact, the independent public accountant 
can assist managment in demonstrating com-
pliance with the Act by: 
• Recommending plans for the systematic re-
view, documentation, and evaluation of inter-
nal controls 
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• Providing instructional manuals on methods 
and techniques for describing, testing and 
evaluating internal controls 
• Conducting training programs for internal au-
ditors and other company personnel selected 
to review internal controls 
• Evaluating the efforts of company personnel 
reviewing internal controls 
• Recommending changes in internal controls to 
overcome identified deficiencies. 
CONCLUSION 
In essence, the Accounting Standards Provision 
of the Act became effective when it was signed 
into law on December 19, 1977. No period for 
transition or adjustment is specified in the law. 
Companies that are affected can assume that no 
action is required since management has always 
been concerned with the adequacy of record 
keeping and systems of internal accounting con-
trol. However, we doubt that this is a prudent 
course of action. Instead we recommend a sys-
tematic and documented effort to review the 
adequacy of record keeping and internal controls 
and to make any improvements that business 
judgment dictates advisable. We see two benefits: 
evidence of compliance with the Act if chal-
lenged, and significant improvements in opera-
tions and control. 
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Part II 
The Specifics of Compliance 
This part, dealing with the specifics of com-
pliance, is adapted from Touche Ross internal 
manuals to develop the concepts of corporate 
controls—their objectives, the potential for errors 
and irregularities, and how controls can be 
reviewed and evaluated. The main topics dis-
cussed are 
• Elements of internal accounting control 
• Levels of controls 
• Approach to evaluating controls 
• Reviewing controls 
• Limitations of internal controls. 
ELEMENTS OF INTERNAL ACCOUNTING 
CONTROL 
It is necessary that a system have certain 
elements or characteristics if the two broad 
objectives of internal accounting control, and the 
many detailed objectives they require, are to be 
fulfilled. There are seven such elements, as 
presented below. 
Competent, Trustworthy Personnel with Clear 
Lines of Authority and Responsibility 
The most important element of any system of 
internal control is personnel. If employees are 
competent and trustworthy, some of the other 
elements can be absent and reliable financial 
statements can still result. Honest, efficient peo-
ple are able to perform at a high level even when 
there are few other controls to support them. On 
the other hand, even if the other six elements of 
control are strong, incompetent or dishonest 
people can reduce the system to a shambles. 
Still, the employment of competent and trust-
worthy personnel is not by itself sufficient to meet 
the objectives of internal accounting control. 
People have a number of innate shortcomings 
due to their highly complex nature. They can, for 
example, become bored or dissatisfied; personal 
problems can disrupt their performance, or their 
goals may change. Consequently, it is important 
to make a judgment of the competence and 
integrity of employees, even though it is difficult 
to do, and to use this as a part of the total 
evaluation of the system. The evaluation of 
employees will result from observations, inquiries 
and review of their work. 
Specific responsibility for the performance of 
duties must be assigned to specific individuals if 
the system is to operate effectively and work is to 
be properly performed. If a duty is not ade-
quately performed, it is then possible to place 
responsibility with the person who did the work. 
The one assigned is thus motivated to work 
carefully, and corrective action by management is 
made possible. 
Adequate Segregation of Duties 
There are four general types of segregation of 
duties for the prevention of both intentional and 
unintentional errors that are of special sig-
nificance. These are discussed below. 
1. Separation of operational responsibility from 
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financial record keeping responsibility. If each 
department or division in an organization was 
responsible for preparing its own records and 
reports, there would be a tendency to bias the 
results to improve its reported performance. In 
order to ensure unbiased information, financial 
record keeping is typically included in a separate 
department under the controllership function. 
(This need not necessarily be the case for 
non-financial reports; for example, sales demog-
raphy reports may properly be maintained by the 
sales department.) 
2. Separation of the custody of assets from 
accounting. The reason for not permitting the 
person who has temporary or permanent custody 
of an asset to account for that asset is to protect 
the firm against defalcation. When one person 
performs both functions, there is an excessive risk 
of his or her disposing of the asset for personal 
gain and adjusting the records to eliminate 
responsibility for the asset. If the cashier, for 
example, receives cash and maintains both the 
cash and accounts receivable records, it might be 
possible to take the cash received from a cus-
tomer and adjust the customer's account by 
failing to record a sale or by recording a fictitious 
credit to the account. Other examples of inade-
quate segregation of the custodial function in-
clude the distribution of payroll checks by a 
payroll clerk who might be in a position to 
initiate a false employee on the payroll and keep 
the check for personal gain, and the maintenance 
of inventory records by storeroom personnel who 
might be able to sell items for personal gain and 
cover up the theft. 
In an EDP system, any person with custody of 
assets should be prevented from performing the 
programming or operating function, and be de-
nied access to punched cards or other input 
records. As a general rule it is desirable that any 
person performing an accounting function, 
whether it be in an EDP or in a manual system, 
be denied access to assets that can be converted 
to personal gain. 
3. Separation of the authorization of transactions 
from the custody of related assets. It is desirable, 
to the extent that it is possible, to prevent persons 
who authorize transactions from having control 
over the related asset. For example, the same 
person should not authorize the payment of a 
vendor's invoice and also sign the check in 
payment of the bill. Similarly, the authority for 
adding newly hired employees to the payroll or 
eliminating those who have terminated employ-
ment should be performed by someone other 
than the person responsible for distributing 
checks to the employees. Nor should anyone who 
handles incoming cash receipts have the authority 
to determine which accounts should be charged 
off as uncollectible. As illustrated, the authoriza-
tion of a transaction and the handling of the 
related asset by the same person increases the 
possibility of fraud within the organization. 
4. Separation of duties within the accounting 
function. The least desirable accounting system is 
one in which one employee is responsible for 
recording a transaction from its origin to its 
ultimate posting in the general ledger. This 
enhances the likelihood that unintentional errors 
will remain undetected. 
There are many opportunities for automatic 
cross-checking of different employees' work in a 
manual system by simply segregating the record-
ing in journals from the recording in related 
subsidiary ledgers. It is also possible to segregate 
the responsibility for recording in related jour-
nals, such as the sales and cash receipts journals. 
In most cases adequate segregation of accounting 
duties, where each person performs his work 
independently, substantially increases control 
over errors without any duplication of effort. 
In an EDP system, segregation of duties is of a 
different nature than in manual systems, but it is 
of equal importance. Because the need for 
frequent cross-checking is unnecessary due to the 
computer's ability to perform consistently and 
uniformly, the segregation of duties within the 
EDP operation puts greater emphasis on control 
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over lost records, improper programming, and 
fraudulent transactions. For these reasons, the 
responsibility for processing of data by computer 
operators, for custody of transaction and library 
files, and for programming should be separated. 
The overall organization structure of a business 
must provide proper segregation of duties, yet 
still promote operational efficiency and effective 
communication. 
Proper Procedures for Authorization 
Every transaction must be properly authorized 
if control is to be satisfactory. If any person in an 
organization could acquire or expend assets at 
will, complete chaos would result. 
Authorization can be either general or specific. 
In performing its function of general authoriza-
tion, management establishes policies for the 
organization to follow. Subordinates are in-
structed to implement these general authoriza-
tions by approving all transactions within the 
limits set by the policy. Examples of general 
authority are the issuance of fixed price lists for 
the sale of products, credit limits for customers, 
and fixed automatic reorder points for making 
purchases. 
Specific authority has to do with individual 
transactions. For some transactions, management 
is unwilling to establish a general policy of 
authorization. Instead, it prefers to make authori-
zations on a case-by-case basis. An example is 
the authorization of a sales transaction by the 
sales manager for a used car company. 
The individual or group who can grant either 
specific or general authority for transactions 
should hold a position commensurate with the 
nature and significance of the transactions, and 
the policy for such authority should be estab-
lished by top management. For example, a 
common policy is to have all acquisitions of 
capital assets over a set amount authorized by the 
board of directors. 
Approval of a transaction should be distin-
guished from authorization. Approval is only an 
indication that the conditions required by au-
thorization have apparently been met. For exam-
ple, the initials of approval on a vendor's invoice 
may be intended to mean that the goods being 
paid for were ordered and received by the 
company; however, it is possible that they were in 
fact not, and that the approval and initialling 
were perfunctory. Because of this, it is often 
necessary to look beyond approval to other 
evidence of authorization when knowledge of the 
system and/or circumstances cause doubts about 
the effectiveness of the approval process. 
Adequate Documents and Records 
Documents and records are the physical ob-
jects upon which transactions are entered and 
summarized. They include such diverse items as 
sales invoices, purchase orders, subsidiary ledgers 
sales journals, time cards, and bank reconcilia-
tions; and they may be in either "hard-copy" 
form or in the form of machine readable media. 
Both documents of original entry and records 
upon which transactions are entered are impor-
tant elements of a system, but the inadequacy of 
documents normally causes greater control prob-
lems. 
Documents perform the function of transmit-
ting information throughout the organization and 
between different organizations. The documents 
must be adequate to provide reasonable assur-
ance that all assets are properly controlled and all 
transactions correctly recorded. For example, if 
the receiving department fills out a receiving 
report when material is obtained, the accounts 
payable department can verify the quantity and 
description on the vendor's invoice by comparing 
it with the information on the receiving report. 
Certain relevant principles dictate the proper 
design and use of documents and records. Docu-
ments and records should be: 
a) Sufficiently simple to make sure that they are 
clearly understood. 
b) Designed for multiple uses whenever possible, 
to minimize the number of different forms. 
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For example, a properly designed and used 
sales invoice can be the basis for recording 
sales in the journals, the authority for ship-
ment, the basis for developing sales statistics, 
and the support for salesmen's commissions. 
c) Constructed in a manner that encourages 
correct preparation. This can be done by 
providing a degree of internal check within the 
form or record. For example, a document 
might include instructions for proper routing, 
blank spaces for authorizations and approvals, 
and designated column spaces for numerical 
data. These help assure proper inclusion of all 
required information. 
d) Prenumbered consecutively to facilitate con-
trol over missing documents, and as an aid in 
locating documents when they are needed at a 
later date. 
e) Prepared at the time a transaction takes place, 
or as soon thereafter as possible. When there 
is a longer time interval, records are less 
credible and the chance for error is increased. 
A control closely related to documents and 
records is the chart of accounts, which classifies 
transactions into individual balance sheet and 
income statement accounts. The chart of accounts 
is an important control because it provides the 
framework for determining the information pre-
sented to management and other financial state-
ment users. It must contain sufficient information 
to permit the presentation of financial statements 
in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles, but in addition the classification of the 
information should help management make deci-
sions. Information by divisions, product lines, 
responsibility centers, and similar breakdowns 
should be provided for. The chart of accounts is 
helpful in preventing misclassification errors if it 
accurately and precisely describes which type of 
transactions should be in each account. It is 
especially important that the descriptions clearly 
distinguish between capital assets, inventories, 
and expense items, since these are the major 
categories of concern to external users of the 
financial statements. 
Proper Procedures for Record Keeping 
If the financial statements are to properly 
reflect the actual transactions during the period, 
there must be procedures to assure the proper 
recording of all transactions. This aspect of 
control is especially significant because it relates 
directly to the objective of providing reliable 
data. Like many of the elements of control, this 
one is closely related to each of the others. If the 
other elements of control are proper, the likeli-
hood of having adequate record keeping is 
enhanced. For example, the presence of compe-
tent, trustworthy personnel with well-defined 
responsibilities for keeping the records, but with-
out access to assets, greatly increases the likeli-
hood of proper record keeping. Similarly, the 
existence of adequate documents and records and 
adequate internal verification is also beneficial in 
providing adequate record keeping. 
The procedures for proper record keeping 
should be spelled out in procedures manuals to 
encourage consistent application. The manuals 
should define the flow of documents throughout 
the organization and should provide for sufficient 
information to facilitate adequate record keeping 
and the maintenance of proper control over 
assets. For example, to assure the proper record-
ing of the purchase of raw materials, a copy of 
the purchase order for acquiring the merchandise 
and a copy of the receiving report when the raw 
materials are received should be sent to accounts 
payable. This procedure aids in properly record-
ing purchases in the accounts payable journal, 
and it facilitates the determination of whether the 
vendor's invoice from the supplier should be 
paid. If both purchase orders and receiving 
reports are prenumbered, the accounts payable 
clerk can account for the numerical sequence of 
these documents as a means of determining 
whether all purchases have been recorded. 
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Physical Control Over Assets and Records 
The most important type of protective measure 
for safeguarding assets and records is the use of 
physical precautions. An example is the use of 
storerooms for inventory to guard against pilfer-
age. When the storeroom is under the control of 
a competent employee, there is also further 
assurance that obsolescence is minimized. Fire-
proof safes and safety deposit vaults for the 
protection of assets such as currency and sec-
urities are other important physical safeguards. 
Physical safeguards are also necessary for 
records and documents. The redevelopment of 
lost or destroyed records is costly and time 
consuming. Imagine what would happen if an 
accounts receivable master file were destroyed. 
The considerable cost of backup records and 
other controls can be justified to prevent this loss. 
Similarly, such documents as insurance policies 
and notes receivable should be physically pro-
tected. 
Mechanical and electronic protective devices 
can also be used to obtain additional assurance 
that accounting information is current and accu-
rately recorded. Cash registers and certain types 
of automatic data-processing equipment are all 
potentially useful additions to the system of 
internal control for this purpose. 
Independent Checks on Performance 
(Internal Verification) 
The last specific element of control is the 
careful and continuous review of the other six 
elements in the system. The need for a system of 
internal checks arises for at least three reasons: 
first, a system tends to change over time unless 
there is a mechanism for frequent review. Per-
sonnel are likely to forget procedures, become 
careless, or intentionally fail to follow them 
unless someone is there to observe and evaluate 
their performance. Second, both fraudulent and 
unintentional errors are always possible, regard-
less of the quality of the controls. And third, 
there is a need to periodically compare recorded 
accountability with physical assets in order to 
assure that they are properly safeguarded, and to 
determine the existence of possibly unrecorded or 
improperly recorded transactions. 
An essential characteristic of the persons per-
forming internal verification procedures is 
independence from the individuals originally re-
sponsible for preparing the data. A considerable 
portion of the value of checks on performance is 
lost when the individual doing the verification is a 
subordinate of the person originally responsible 
for preparing the data, or lacks independence in 
some other way. 
The least expensive means of in ternal 
verification is the separation of duties in the 
manner previously discussed. For example, when 
the accounts receivable subsidiary records, the 
sales journal, and the general ledger are main-
tained by different people, each of them automat-
ically verifies a part of the work of the others. 
Similarly, when the bank reconciliation is per-
formed by a person independent of the account-
ing records and handling of cash, there is an 
opportunity for verification without incurring 
significant additional costs. 
Some important types of verification can only 
be accomplished by a duplication of effort. For 
example, the counting of inventory by two 
different teams to make certain that the count is 
correct is costly, but frequently necessary. 
Another example is the use of a keypunch verifier 
in an EDP system. In this control procedure a 
second person keypunches the same information 
as was originally keypunched, and the results of 
these two independent activities are automatically 
compared for differences. Even though the cost 
of performing the same work more than once 
may seem excessive, it is sometimes the only 
practical way of ensuring accurate and reliable 
results. 
The existence of an internal audit staff is usually 
a highly effective method of verifying the proper 
recording of financial information. If the internal 
audit staff is independent of both the operating 
and the accounting departments, and if it reports 
directly to top management or the audit commit-
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tee of the board of directors, there is an excellent 
opportunity for extensive verification within the 
organization. 
It is important to understand that the above 
elements of control are complementary and 
should not be thought of as alternatives. Any one 
control will have advantages and disadvantages 
when compared with other controls. An effective 
accounting system will utilize a mix of controls 
designed to compensate for the particular disad-
vantages of individual controls. 
LEVELS OF CONTROLS 
The concept of internal control includes all the 
control systems in an enterprise that affect assets 
and/or financial data. Because internal control is 
designed to help achieve pre-determined objec-
tives, these will include the planning processes as 
well as the various detailed control systems. 
The planning and control systems of an enter-
prise can be segregated into three levels: 
a) Strategic planning 
b) Management planning and control 
c) Operational control. 
Strategic planning relates to the long-term 
planning process of the enterprise. Strategic 
planning decisions determine the objectives of 
the enterprise and the nature of its business. 
Management planning and control involves the 
short-term planning and control cycle used to 
accomplish the enterprise's objectives. For exam-
ple, management control functions would include 
setting yearly budgets and monitoring perfor-
mance against budgets. 
Operational control is the function of assuring 
that day-to-day routine activities are performed 
effectively and efficiently. Operational controls 
can be viewed at two levels: systems-level con-
trols and corporate-level controls. Systems-level 
controls relate to processing transactions by 
general classification (e.g., sales, cash receipts, 
cash disbursements). Corporate-level controls cut 
across all systems to assure that the systems are 
maintained. These include such things as internal 
audit and the chart of accounts. Corporate-level 
controls are in effect "controls on controls" and 
greatly facilitate both the effectiveness of the 
systems and the monitoring by management. 
The following examples are given to illustrate 
the difference between these planning and control 
levels and to give examples of the types of 
activity that might be carried out at each level: 
LEVELS OF PLANNING AND CONTROL 
Strategic Planning 
Long-range planning —» 








Formulating profit plans —> 
















It is important to clearly understand these 
three levels of planning and control, and their 
interrelationship, because they will form the basis 
for understanding within a particular company 
the controls present in the accounting systems. 
When a system is described and analyzed, this 
is generally done by dividing it into major 
transaction cycles, with controls which affect all 
transactions being classified as corporate-level 
controls. This procedure can be illustrated using 
the following transaction cycles which are com-
mon to most commercial and manufacturing 
companies: 
—Sales and collections 
—Procurement and payment 
—Payroll 
—Inventory and warehousing 
Among the controls normally considered to be 
in the corporate-level category, are the following: 
—An audit committee of the board of directors 
(most commonly for publicly held companies) 
—The aspects of organizational structure which 
relate to organizational units, rather than 
specific systems 
—Monthly financial statements 
—Internal audit 
—Procedural manuals 
—The chart of accounts 
—Bonding of employees in a position of trust 
—A mandatory vacation policy 
—A well defined conflict-of-interest policy and 
monitoring system 
—Reasonable record retention policies in accor-
dance with state and federal laws. 
A P P R O A C H TO EVALUATING CONTROLS 
Notwithstanding the need to understand con-
trols at all levels, the greatest portion of time in 
the typical review of internal controls is spent 
analyzing and evaluating the detailed controls 
intended to meet the broad objectives of 
safeguarding assets and assuring the reliability of 
accounting information. 
Objectives 
Within specific accounting subsystems (i.e., 
transaction cycles) elements of control are de-
signed and related so as to prevent and/or detect 
seven general classes of errors, or stated alterna-
tively, to achieve seven internal control objec-
tives. These are more specific than those defined 
in the definition of internal accounting control 
and serve as a framework in evaluating internal 
controls. The seven objectives for any given 
transaction type together with examples of the 
types of errors for each objective, are given 
below: 
Recorded Transactions are Valid. This objective 
deals with the possibility of invalid transactions 
being included in the records. Instances include 
the recording of a sale when no shipment took 
place, or a charge-off of an uncollectible account 
that has actually been paid. 
Transactions are Properly Authorized. If a 
transaction takes place without proper authoriza-
tion at the key points, an improper transaction 
may have occurred. Examples of transactions 
without proper authorization include the failure 
to authorize shipments and the acceptance of 
unauthorized sales returns and allowances. 
Existing Transactions are Recorded. An error 
under this objective occurs whenever there is a 
failure to record a transaction. This objective is 
the counterpart of the validity of the recorded 
transactions objective inasmuch as it deals with 
valid transactions not being recorded rather than 
recorded transactions not being valid. One exam-
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ple is the shipment of goods without billing or 
inclusion in the accounting records. Less obvious 
examples are the recording of an increase in the 
allowance for doubtful accounts or reserve for 
inventory obsolescence when the respective asset 
values become impaired. Although these are not 
"transactions" in the strict sense, and are often 
viewed as separate from the processing of tradi-
tional types of recurring events (conventional 
transactions), they are recorded nonetheless, are 
subject to errors, and must be properly con-
trolled. 
Transactions are Properly Valued. Even though 
all transactions are included in the records and 
are authorized and valid, they may be stated at an 
incorrect amount. For the financial statements to 
be fairly stated, the individual transactions must 
be recorded at the correct amount. As an 
illustration, the quantities, prices, extensions, and 
footings on sales invoices must be correctly stated 
to meet this objective. 
Transactions are Properly Classified. This ob-
jective deals with the possibility of a transaction 
in the cycle being classified improperly. Examples 
of misclassifications include the recording of the 
purchase of a fixed asset as an expense, the 
recording of the receipt of loan proceeds as a 
collection of an outstanding account receivable, 
and the recording of a collection of an account 
receivable as a cash sale. 
Transactions Are Recorded at the Proper Time. 
In addition to being correctly recorded, transac-
tions must be recorded in the proper reporting 
period. Failure to do so is referred to as a cutoff 
error, and can result in either an understatement 
or overstatement of the affected accounts. The 
failure to record transactions on a timely basis 
can also result in the complete omission of the 
recording due to the loss or mishandling of the 
records. It is important, therefore, to record 
transactions resonably soon after they occur. 
Transactions are Properly Posted to the Sub-
sidiary Records and Correctly Summarized. Since 
the individual transactions are the source of the 
balances in the financial statements, they must be 
correctly posted to subsidiary records, the general 
ledger, and other reports and those must be 
correctly summarized. A defalcation can be cov-
ered up in sales by underfooting the sales journal 
or posting the amounts in the journal to the 
general ledger incorrectly. An example of unin-
tentional error would be recording an amount 
owed the company in the wrong customer ac-
count. 
REVIEWING CONTROLS 
Once a good description of a system of controls 
has been developed, the review can be performed 
in the following manner: 
a) Identifying the types of transactions processed 
by the system. 
b) Identifying the types of errors that could 
occur for each transaction type using the 
seven general objectives/error types as a 
guide. 
c) Tracing through the system description to 
identify: 
(1) Those controls (elements or sets of ele-
ments) existing in the system which 
should prevent or detect and correct each 
type of error. These represent strengths in 
the system. 
(2) Those types of errors for which no 
effective controls exist in the system. 
These represent system weaknesses. 
As a general guide, the seven objectives/error 
types and the common elements of control used 






Common Elements of Control 
(Not All Inclusive) 
Recorded transactions are valid/invalid • Segregation of duties 
• Use of prenumbered documents which are 
accounted for 
• Cancellation of documents to prevent reuse 
• Monthly reconciliation of subsidiary records and 
follow-up by an independent person. 
Transactions are properly authorized/not 
authorized 
• Policy on specific or general authorization at key 
points (e.g., granting credit) 
• Procedures for approvals consistent with policy and 
requiring documentation (e.g., attaching signa-
tures or supporting documents). 
Existing transactions are recorded/not 
recorded 
• Use of prenumbered documents which are ac-
counted for 
• Segregation of duties 
• Monthly reconciliation of subsidiary records and 
follow-up by an independent person. 
Transactions are properly/improperly 
valued 
• Internal verification of details and calculations and 
posting by an independent person 
• Reconciliation of details to control totals (e.g., bank 
reconciliation) by an independent person. 
Transactions are properly/improperly 
classified 
• Use of an adequate chart of accounts 
• Internal review and verification. 
Transactions are recorded at the 
proper/improper time 
• Procedures to assure prompt recording of all trans-
actions 
• Internal verification. 
Transactions are properly/improperly 
included in the subsidiary records 
and correctly/incorrectly summarized 
• Segregation of duties 
• Monthly reconciliation of subsidiary records by an 
independent person 
• Internal verification. 
Prevention vs. Detection Controls 
In addition to considering controls in terms of 
levels in relation to corporate planning, and in 
terms of the elements comprising control, it is 
useful to categorize controls in other ways. In 
designing controls, particularly in the EDP area 
for example, controls are often segregated into 
two broad classifications: "prevention controls," 
whose objective is to prevent errors from occur-
ring, and "detection controls," whose objective is 
to detect errors that have occurred and assure 
their correction on a timely basis. 
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• Prevention controls are advantageous in that 
they are often highly cost effective. They are 
"built-in" as part of the system unrelated to the 
volume of transactions. Since they prevent errors, 
when they are functioning effectively, they avoid 
the cost of correcting errors, which can be quite 
high. Control elements which are generally pre-
ventive in nature are trustworthy personnel, 
segregation of duties (to prevent intentional 
errors), proper authorization, adequate docu-
ments and records, proper record keeping proce-
dures, and physical controls over assets. 
• Detection controls, while more costly than 
prevention controls are nonetheless necessary. 
One reason is that they measure the efficiency of 
prevention controls. Secondly, there are certain 
types of errors which cannot be controlled pre-
ventively in a cost-effective manner. In order to 
be effective, detection controls must include 
procedures to assure timely correction of the 
errors that are detected. 
Detection controls include record keeping pro-
cedures and independent checks on performance, 
often through segregation of duties. Whereas 
prevention controls may not always be noticeable 
because of their built-in nature, detection con-
trols are generally obvious to those involved with 
them. However at the management level, some 
controls may exist which act as detection controls 
although they may not specifically be designed as 
such. For example, although management's re-
view of monthly financial statements will usually 
be directed toward an analysis of variances from 
budget and the identification of the necessary 
corrective action, the investigation of variances 
will usually detect errors in the recorded results, 
since management will want to determine the 
cause of the apparent variance before attempting 
to correct the situation. Another example is that 
of a division manager who is held accountable 
through a responsibility accounting system de-
signed to charge only variable (and, therefore, 
controllable) costs to his division. The manager's 
primary objective in reviewing divisional account-
ing reports may be directed to cost control, but 
an important by-product will usually be the 
detection of accounting errors. Other examples of 
these controls are: 
—Reconciliation of cash balances with bank 
statement. 
—Confirmation of bank balances using a stan-
dard confirmation, which would request infor-
mation concerning loans and liens on assets to 
determine whether any off-the-book amounts 
or unrecorded liens on assets exist. This step 
attempts to address the prohibition against 
funds carried off-the-books. Management 
should recognize, in the attempts to comply 
with the Act, that funds can be raised by 
pledges of assets. 
—Physical count of major cash funds. 
—Inspection or confirmation of marketable 
securities. 
—Reconcil iat ion of income received f rom 
marketable securities to published sources. 
—Reconciliation of accounts receivable details to 
accounts receivable controls. 
—Review of accounts receivable agings to 
determine collectibility. 
—Physical counts of inventories and analyses of 
variances. 
—Physical inspection of plant and equipment. 
—Review of underlying records of investees to 
establish the appropriate carrying amount. 
—Conf i rmat ion with vendors of accounts 
payable. 
These examples serve to illustrate that al-
though the management process will usually be 
designed primarily to help achieve the objectives 
of the enterprise, it may also have an important 
influence on the reliability of the financial infor-
mation. 
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LIMITATIONS OF INTERNAL CONTROL 
Although reliance on internal control is essen-
tial in the operation of a business, complete 
reliance on internal control to the exclusion of 
special independent checks by internal auditors 
and external auditors particularly with respect to 
material amounts in the financial statements is 
unwise for three primary reasons. 
First, control systems are designed to provide 
reasonable, but not absolute, assurance that the 
objectives of good internal accounting control 
will be accomplished. The concept of reasonable 
assurance recognizes that the cost of internal 
control should not exceed the benefits expected 
to be derived. Thus, systems will seldom exist 
which can "guarantee" that all errors will be 
prevented or detected and corrected on a timely 
basis. 
Second, there are inherent limitations in the 
performance of many control procedures which 
preclude absolute reliance. These include pos-
sibilities for errors arising from such causes as 
misunderstanding of instructions, mistakes of 
judgment, and personal carelessness, distraction 
or fatigue. Procedures whose effectiveness de-
pends on segregation of duties can be circum-
vented by collusion. And procedures whose ob-
jective is to assure the execution and recording of 
transactions in accordance with management's 
authorization may be ineffective against acts by 
management itself. 
Finally, any projection of internal accounting 
control to future periods is subject to the risk that 
the procedures may become inadequate because 
of changes in conditions and that the degree of 
compliance with the procedures may deteriorate. 
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95th CONGRESS ) HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Report 
1st Session } No. 95-831 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES 
DECEMBer 6, 1977.—Ordered to be printed 
Mr. STAGGERS, from the committee of conference, 
submitted the following 
CONFERENCE REPORT 
[To accompany S. 806] 
The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two 
Houses on the amendments of the House to the bill (S. 305) to amend 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require issuers of securities 
registered pursuant to section 12 of such Act to maintain accurate 
records, to prohibit certain bribes, and for other purposes, having 
met, after ful l and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do 
recommend to their respective Houses as follows: 
That the Senate recede from its disagreement to the amendment of 
the House to the text of the bill and agree to the same with an amend-
ment as follows: 
In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the House amend-
ment insert the following: 
TITLE I—FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES 
SHORT TITLE 
SEC. 101. This title may be cited as the "Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act of 1977". 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
Sec. 102. Section 13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(16 U.S.C. 78q(b)) is amended by inserting "(1)" after "(b)" and 
by adding at the end thereof the following: 
" (2) Every issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant 
to section 12 of this title and every issuer which is required to file 
reports pursuant to section 15(d) of this title shall— 
"(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in 
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions 
and dispositions of the assets of the issuer; and 
" ( B ) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting 
controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that— 
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"(i) transactions are executed in accordance with man-
agement's general or specific authorization; 
"(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary ( I ) to permit 
preparation of financial statements in conformity with gen-
erally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria 
applicable to such statements, and ( I I ) to maintain account-
ability for assets; 
"(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance 
with management's general or specific authorization; and 
"(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared 
with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appro-
priate action is taken with respect to any differences. 
"(3) (A) With respect to matters concerning the national security 
of the United States, no duty or liability under paragraph (2) of 
this subsection shall be imposed upon any person acting in coopera-
tion with the head of any Federal department or agency responsible 
for such matters if such act in cooperation with such head of a depart-
ment or agency was done upon the specific, written directive of the 
head of such department or agency pursuant to Presidential authority 
to issue such directives. Each directive issued under this paragraph 
shall set forth the specific facts and circumstances with respect to 
which the provisions of this paragraph are to be invoiced. Each such 
directive shall, unless renewed in writing, expire one year after the date 
of issuance. 
"(B) Each head of a Federal department or agency of the United 
States who issues a directive pursuant to this paragraph shall main-
tain a complete file of all such directives and shall, on October 1 of 
each year, transmit a summary of matters covered by such directives 
in force at any time during the previous year to the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate". 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES BY ISSUERS 
SEC. 103. (a) The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is amended 
by inserting after section 30 the following new section: 
"FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES BY ISSUERS 
"SEC. 30A. (a) It shall be unlawful for any issuer which has a class 
of securities registered pursuant to section 12 of this title or which is 
required to file reports under section 15(d) of this title, or for any 
officer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer or any stockholder 
thereof acting on behalf of such issuer, to make use of the mails or 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in fur-
therance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the 
payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization 
of the giving of anything of value to— 
" (1) any foreign official for purposes of— 
" (A) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official 
in his official capacity, including a decision to fail to perform 
his official functions; or 
"(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with 
a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or 
influence any act or decision of such government or instru-
mentality, 
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in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for 
or with, or directing business to, any person; 
"(2) any foreign political party or official thereof or any candi-
date for foreign political office for purposes of— 
"(A) influencing any act or decision of such party, official, 
or candidate in its or his official capacity, including a decision 
to fail to perform its or his official functions; or 
"(B) inducing such party, official, or candidate to use its or 
his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality 
thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such gov-
ernment or instrumentality, 
in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for 
or with, or directing business to, any person; or 
"(3) any person, while knowing or having reason to know that 
all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, 
given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official, 
to any foreign political party or official thereof, or to any candi-
date for foreign political office, for purposes of— 
"(A) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official, 
political party, party official, or candidate in his or its official 
capacity, including a decision to fail to perform his or its 
official functions; or 
"(B) inducing such foreign official, political party, party 
official, or candidate to use his or its influence with a foreign 
government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence 
any act or decision of such government or instrumentality, 
in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business 
for or with, or directing business to, any person. 
"(b) As used in this section, the term 'foreign official ' means any 
officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, 
agency, or instrumentality thereof, or any person acting in an official 
capacity for or on behalf of such government or department, agency, 
or instrumentality. Such term does not include any employee of a 
foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality 
thereof whose duties are essentially ministerial or clerical.". 
(b) (1) Section 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. 78ff(a)) is amended by inserting "(other than section 30A)" 
immediately after "title" the first place it appears. 
(2) Section 32 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 
78ff) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new 
subsection: 
"(c)(1) Any issuer which violates section 30A (a) of this title shall, 
upon conviction, be fined not more than $1,000,000. 
" (2) Any officer or director of an issuer, or any stockholder acting 
on behalf of such issuer, who willfully violates section 30A (a) of this 
title shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000, or im-
prisoned not more than five years, or both. 
"(3) Whenever an issuer is found to have violated section 30A (a) 
of this title, any employee or agent of such issuer who is a United 
States citizen, national, or resident or is otherwise subject to the juris-
diction of the United States (other than am, officer, director, or stock-
holder of such issuer), and who willfully carried out the act or prac-
tice constituting such violation shall, upon conviction, be fined not 
more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
"(4) Whenever a fine is imposed under paragraph (2) or (3) of this 
subsection upon any officer, director, stockholder, employee, or agent 
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of an issuer, such fine shall not be paid, directly or indirectly, by such 
issuer". 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES BY DOMESTIC CONCERNS 
SEC. 104. (a) It shall be unlawful for any domestic concern, other 
than an issuer which is subject to section 30A of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 193b, or amy officer, director, employee, or agent of such 
domestic concern or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such 
domestic concern, to make use of the mails or any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, 
payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any 
money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving 
of anything of value to— 
(1) any foreign official for purposes of— 
(A) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official 
in his official capacity, including a decision to fail to perform 
his official functions; or 
(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with 
a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or 
influence any act or decision of such government or 
instrumentality, 
in order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining 
business for or with, or directing business to, any person; 
(2) any foreign political party or official thereof or any candi-
date for foreign political office for purposes of— 
(A) influencing any act or decision of such party, official, 
or candidate in its or his official capacity, including a decision 
to fail to perform its or his official functions; or 
(B) inducing such party, official, or candidate to use its or 
his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality 
thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such gov-
ernment or instrumentality, 
in order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining 
business for or with, or directing business to, any person; or 
(3) any person, while knowing or having reason to know that 
all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, 
given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official, 
to any foreign politicial party or official thereof, or to any candi-
date for foreign political office, for purposes of— 
(A) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official, 
political party, party official, or candidate in his or its official 
capacity, including a decision to fail to perform his or its 
official functions; or 
(B) inducing such foreign official, political party, party 
official, or candidate to use his or its influence with a foreign 
government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence 
any act or decision of such government or instrumentality, 
in order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining 
business for or with, or directing business to, any person. 
(b) (1) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), any domestic 
concern which violates subsection (a) shall, upon conviction, be fined 
not more than $1,000,000. 
(B) Any individual who is a domestic concern and who willfully 
violates subsection (a) shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than 
$10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
(2) Any officer or director of a domestic concern, or stockholder 
acting on behalf of such domestic concern, who willfully violates sub-
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section (a) shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000, or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
(3) Whenever a domestic concern is found to have violated subsec-
tion (a) of this section, any employee or agent of such domestic concern 
who is a United States citizen, national, or resident or is otherwise 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States (other than an officer, 
director, or stockholder acting on behalf of such domestic concern), 
and who willfully carried out the act or practice constituting such 
violation shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000, or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
(4) Whenever a fine is imposed under paragraph (2) or (3) of this 
subsection upon any officer, director, stockholder, employee, or agent 
of a domestic concern, such fine shall not be paid, directly or indirectly, 
by such domestic concern. 
(c) Whenever it appears to the Attorney General that any domestic 
concern, or officer, director, employee, agent, or stockholder thereof, is 
engaged, or is about to engage, in any act or practice constituting a 
violation of subsection (a) of this section, the Attorney General may, 
in his discretion, bring a civil action in an appropriate district court 
of the United States to enjoin such act or practice, and upon a proper 
showing a permanent or temporary injunction or a temporary restrain-
ing order shall be granted without bond. 
(d) As used in this section: 
(1) The term "domestic concern" means (A) any individual 
who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States; or (B) 
any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, 
business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietor-
ship, which has its principal place of business in the United States, 
or which is organized under the laws of a State of the United 
States or a territory, possession, or common/wealth of the United 
States. 
(2) The term "foreign official" means any officer or employee of 
a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumen-
tality thereof, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on 
behalf of (my such government or department, agency, or instru-
mentality. Such term does not include any employee of a, foreign 
government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof 
whose duties are essentially ministerial or clerical. 
(3) The term "interstate commerce" means trade, commerce, 
transportation, or communication among the several States, or be-
tween any foreign country and any State or between any State 
and any place or ship outside thereof. Such term includes the 
intrastate use of (A) a telephone or other interstate means of 
communication, or (B) any other interstate instrumentality. 
JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF T H E 
COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE 
The managers on the part of the House and the Senate at the con-
ference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments 
of the House to the bill (S. 305) to amend the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 to require issuers of securities registered pursuant to section 
12 of such Act to maintain accurate records, to prohibit certain bribes, 
and for other purposes, submit the following joint statement to the 
House and the Senate in explanation of the effect of the action agreed 
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upon by the managers and recommended in the accompanying con-
ference report: 
The House amendment to the text of the bill struck out all of the 
Senate bill after the enacting clause and inserted a substitute text. 
The Senate recedes from its disagreement to the amendment of the 
House with an amendment which is a substitute for the Senate bill and 
the House amendment. The differences between the Senate bill, the 
House amendment, and the substitute agreed to in conference are noted 
below, except for clerical corrections, conforming changes made neces-
sary by agreements reached by the conferees, and minor drafting and 
clarifying changes. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS OF JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE 
ON CONFERENCE 
A. Corporate bribery of foreign officials: 
1. Title of the Act. 
2. Accounting: 
a. Integrity of accounting records and reports. 
b. Systems of accounting controls. 
c. Prohibition on falsification of books and records; false state-
ments to accountants. 
d. National security. 
3. Payments to officials: 
a. Prohibition against certain payments to foreign officials by 
issuers subject to SEC jurisdiction. 
1. Definitions. 
2. Penalties. 
b. Prohibition against certain payments to foreign officials by 
domestic concerns: 
1. Definitions. 
2. Department of Justice injunctive power. 
B. Disclosure. 
A . CORPORATE BRIBERY OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS 
1. TITLE OF T H E ACT—FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
The Senate bill established the title of Title I of the Act as the 
"Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977". 
The House amendment established the title of the Act as the "Un-
lawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977". 
The House receded to the Senate. 
2 . ACCOUNTING 
a. Integrity of accounting records and reports 
The Senate bill contained a provision which required issuers subject 
to the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the 
"SEC") to make and keep books, records, and accounts which accu-
rately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets 
of the issuer. 
The House amendment contained no provision. 
The House receded to the Senate with an amendment requiring such 
books, records and accounts to be made and maintained accurately and 
fairly "in reasonable detail". The conference committee adopted the 
"in reasonable detail" qualification to the accurate and fair require-
ment in light of the concern that such a standard, if unqualified, might 
connote a degree of exactitude and precision which is unrealistic. The 
amendment makes clear that the issuer's records should reflect trans-
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actions in conformity with accepted methods of recording economic 
events and effectively prevent off-the-books slush funds and payments 
of bribes. 
b. Systems of accounting controls 
The Senate bill contained a provision requiring issuers to devise and 
maintain adequate systems of internal accounting controls sufficient to 
provide reasonable assurances that, among other things, transactions 
are recorded as necessary to maintain accountability for assets. 
The House amendment contained no provision. 
The House receded to the Senate with an amendment deleting the 
word "adequate". Since the precise requirements of the system of 
internal accounting controls to be maintained by the issuer are set 
forth in specific terms in the statute, the term adequate was deemed 
superfluous. 
c. Prohibition on falsification of books and records; false statements 
to accountants 
The Senate bill contained provisions to make it unlawful for (1) 
any person knowingly to falsify any book, record, or account required 
to be made for any accounting purpose, and (2) any person knowingly 
to make a materially false or misleading statement or to omit to state 
or cause another person to omit any material fact necessary in order 
to make statements to an accountant not misleading. 
The House amendment contained no comparable provisions because 
the SEC had already published for comment rules designed to accom-
plish similar objectives under its existing authority. 
The Senate receded to the House. Although these provisions were 
supportive of the basic accounting section, the use of the "knowingly" 
standard has become involved in an issue never intended to be raised 
or resolved by the Senate bill—namely, whether or not the inclusion 
or deletion of the word "knowingly" would or would not affirm, ex-
pand, or overrule the decision of the Supreme Court in Ernst & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder (425 U.S. 185). As stated clearly in the Com-
mittee Report on S. 305, these provisions were to be severable from the 
rest of the securities laws. 
Under the circumstances, the conferees determined the best method 
of proceeding was to retain only new section 13(b) (2) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934. The conferees further decided that this 
legislation should not be converted into a debate on the important 
issues raised by. the Hochfelder decision. 
In deleting the Senate provisions, the conferees intend that no in-
ference should be drawn with respect to any rulemaking authority the 
SEC may or may not have under the securities laws. 
d. National security 
The Senate bill contained provisions which excluded from any duty 
or liability under paragraph (2) any person acting in cooperation 
with and at the specific written directive of any Federal agency or 
department responsible for matters concerning national security. Such 
directives were to be executed with specificity and to expire annually 
unless renewed in writing. The President of the United States was di-
rected to review such directives annually and to certify that such di-
rectives involved classified information and were in conformity to 
applicable statutes and Executive orders. 
The House amendment contained no provision. 
The House receded to the Senate with an amendment. The amend-
ment required that each directive be issued only pursuant to Presiden-
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tial authority to issue such directives. 
In addition, the amendment provides that a summary of all such 
directives shall be submitted annually to the appropriate intelligence 
oversight committees. 
The conferees intend to make clear, as set forth in the Senate provi-
sion, that the only matters to be excluded from the requirements of 
paragraph (2) are those which would result, or would be likely to 
result, in the disclosure of information which has been classified by 
the appropriate department or agency for protection in the interests 
of the national security and then only to the extent that such informa-
tion is specifically related to the person's lawful cooperation. 
3. PAYMENTS TO OFFICIALS 
a. Prohibitions against certain payments to foreign officials by issuers 
subject to SEC jurisdiction 
The Senate bill amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 
"Exchange Act") to prohibit the corrupt use of the mails or other 
means of interstate commerce by any issuer of securities registered 
with the SEC pursuant to section 12(b) or required to file reports pur-
suant to section 15(d) of the Exchange Act as well as any officer, 
director, employee or stockholder acting on behalf of the issuer, in 
furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of 
the payment of money or anything else of value to any official of a 
foreign government or instrumentality thereof, any foreign political 
party, any candidate for foreign political office, or any other person 
which the issuer knows or has reason to know will make such offer, 
promise or gift. The scope of the prohibition was limited by the 
requirement that the offer, promise, authorization, payment, or gift-
must have as a purpose inducing the recipient to use his influence with 
the foreign government or instrumentality, influencing the enactment 
or promulgation of legislation or regulations of that government or 
instrumentality or refraining from performing any official responsi-
bilities, so as to direct business to any person, maintain an established 
business opportunity with any person or divert a business opportunity 
from any person. 
The House amendment was similar to the Senate bill; however, the 
scope of the House amendment was not limited by the "business pur-
pose" test, nor did it contain the "in furtherance of" requirement. 
The conference substitute includes provisions found in both the Sen-
ate bill and the House amendment. In section 30A(a), the conferees 
adopted the identical provisions of both bills with the addition of the 
Senate "in furtherance of" language. The conference substitute pro-
hibits corporations subject to SEC jurisdiction from making corrupt 
use of the mails or other means of interstate commerce in furtherance 
of an offer, payment, promise to pay or authorization of payment of 
anything of value to any foreign official, foreign political party, can-
didate for foreign political office or any other person which the issuer 
knows or has reason to know will make such offer, promise or payment. 
The adoption of the Senate "in furtherance of" language makes clear 
that, the use of interstate commerce need only be in furtherance of 
making the corrupt payment. 
By incorporating provisions from both bills, the conferees clarified 
the scope of the prohibition by requiring that the purpose of the pay-
ment must be to influence any act or decision of a foreign official 
(including a decision not to act) or to induce such official to use his 
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influence to affect a government act or decision so as to assist an issuer 
in obtaining, retaining or directing business to any person. 
1. Definitions.—The Senate bill contained no definitional section. 
The House amendment defined the terms "control" and "foreign 
official". "Control" was defined as the power to exercise a controlling 
influence over the management or policies of an issuer. Any person 
who owned beneficially, either directly or through one or more con-
trolled issuers, more than 50 percent of the voting securities of an 
issuer, was presumed to control such issuer and any person who did 
not own more than 50 percent of the voting securities of an issuer was 
presumed not to have such control. 
"Foreign official" was defined to mean any officer or employee of a 
foreign government or any department, agency or instrumentality 
thereof, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of 
such government, department, agency, or instrumentality. The term 
did not include employees whose duties were primarily ministerial or 
clerical. 
The Senate receded to the House concerning the definition of "for-
eign official" and the House receded to the Senate concerning the defi-
nition of "control." 
2. Penalties.—The Senate bill provided fines of not more than $500,-
000 for willful violations by issuers and penalties of up to $10,000 and/ 
or 5 years imprisonment for willful violations by any officer, director, 
employee or shareholder thereof. 
The House amendment provided a fine of not more than $1 million 
for knowing and willful violations by an issuer. Penalties for know-
ing and willful violations by officers, directors, agents, or natural per-
sons in control of any issuer were similar to those provided in the 
Senate bill. However, an agent's liability was predicated upon a find-
ing that the issuer violated the section. Finally, the House amendment 
prohibited an issuer from paying either directly or indirectly any 
fine imposed under this section upon any officer, director, agent or 
natural person in control of such issuer. 
The conference substitute adopts the maximum corporate penalty 
in the House amendment and the penalties applicable to officers, di-
rectors, employees, and stockholders acting on behalf of the issuer 
as provided in the Senate bill. The conference substitute incorporates 
the "agent" provisions of the House amendment. To provide additional 
protection for agents and employees, the conference substitute predi-
cates an employee's or agent's liability upon a finding that the issuer 
has violated the section. As in the House amendment, the conference 
substitute prohibits an issuer from paying, either directly or indi-
rectly, any fine imposed upon any individual under this section. 
b. Prohibition against certain payments to foreign officials by domestic 
concerns 
Both the Senate bill and the House amendment applied their respec-
tive prohibitions and penalties from the previous sections to domestic 
concerns other than those subject to SEC jurisdiction. 
The conference substitute parallels the agreement reached by the 
conferees with respect to the provisions governing issuers. 
1. Definitions.—The Senate bill defined several terms used in this 
section. "Domestic concern" is defined as an individual who is a citizen 
or national of the United States as well as any corporation, partner-
ship, association, joint-stock company, business trust, or unincorpo-
rated organization which is owned or controlled by individuals who 
are citizens or nationals of the United States and which has its prin-
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cipal place of business in the United States or which is organized 
under the laws of a State or any territory, possession or common-
wealth of the United States. 
The Senate bill restated the definition of interstate commerce in 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
The House amendment defined the terms "control" and "foreign 
official" as previously discussed. In addition, the House amendment 
defined the term "domestic concern" as any corporation, partnership, 
association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated or-
ganization or sole proprietorship (1) which is owned or controlled by 
individuals who are citizens or nationals of the United States, (2) 
which has its principal place of business in the United States, or (3) 
which is organized under the laws of a State of the United States or 
any territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States. The 
House amendment extended the coverage of the section to U.S. con-
trolled foreign subsidiaries. 
The Senate receded to the House concerning the definition of "for-
eign official." The House receded to the Senate concerning the defini-
tion of control. The House receded to the Senate in the definition of 
"domestic concern" with an amendment to make clear that any com-
pany having a principal place of business in the United States would 
be subject to the bill. 
In receding to the Senate, the conferees recognized the inherent ju-
risdictional, enforcement, and diplomatic difficulties raised by the 
inclusion of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies in the direct pro-
hibitions of the bill. However, the conferees intend to make clear that 
any issuer or domestic concern which engages in bribery of foreign 
officials indirectly through any other person or entity would itself be 
liable under the bill. The conferees recognized that such jurisdictional, 
enforcement, and diplomatic difficulties may not be present in the case 
of individuals who are U.S. citizens, nationals, or residents. Therefore, 
individuals other than those specifically covered by the bill (e.g., 
officers, directors, employees, agents, or stockholders acting on behalf 
of an issuer or domestic concern) will be liable when they act in rela-
tion to the affairs of any foreign subsidiary of an issuer or domestic 
concern if they are citizens, nationals, or residents of the United 
States. In addition, the conferees determined that foreign nationals or 
residents otherwise under the jurisdiction of the United States would 
be covered by the bill in circumstances where an issuer or domestic 
concern engaged in conduct proscribed by the bill. 
Department of Justice injunctive power.—The House amendment 
authorized the Department of Justice to enforce violations of the bill 
by domestic concerns through civil injunctions. 
The Senate bill contained no provision. The Senate receded to the 
House. 
HARLEY O . STAGGERS, 
BOB ECKHARDT, 
R A L P H H . METCALF, 
ROBERT KRUEGER, 
CHARLES J . CARNEY, 
SAMUEL DEVINE, 
J I M BROYHILL, 
Managers on the 
Part of the House. 
W I L L I A M PROXMIRE, 
J O H N SPARKMAN, 
HARRISON A . WILLIAMS, J R . , 
EDWARD W . BROOKE, 
J O H N TOWER, 
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1st Session ( No. 114 
F O R E I G N C O R R U P T P R A C T I C E S A N D D O M E S T I C A N D 
F O R E I G N I N V E S T M E N T D I S C L O S U R E A C T S O F 1 9 7 7 
MAT 2 (legislative day , MARCH 28), 1977.—Ordered t o be printed 
Mr. PROXMIRE , from the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, submitted the following 
R E P O R T 
[to accompany S. 305] 
The Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs favorably 
reports a bill (S. 305) to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
to require companies subject to the jurisdiction of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission to maintain accurate records, to prohibit 
certain bribes, to expand and improve disclosure of ownership of the 
securities of U.S. companies, and for other purposes, and recommends 
that the bill, as amended by the committee, do pass. 
HISTORY OF THE B I L L 
During the 94th Congress, the Committee on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs held extensive hearings on the matter of improper 
payments to foreign government officials by American corporations. 
The committee also considered several bills designed to deal with the Problem in various ways including S. 3133 introduced by Senator Proxmire on March 11, 1976; S. 3379 introduced by Senators Church, 
Clark, and Pearson on May 5,1976, and S. 3418 introduced by Senator 
Proxmire at the request of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) on May 12, 1976. 
On May 12, 1976, the committee received from the SEC an extensive 
"Report on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Prac-
tices," ("SEC report") which summarized the SEC's enforcement 
activities and findings to that date. That report traced the history of 
the Commission's discovery of conduct involving the misuse of cor-
porate funds and the commencement of investigations which sub-
sequently revealed that instances of undisclosed questionable or illegal 
corporate payments were indeed widespread and represented a serious 
breach in the operation of the Commission's system of corporate 
disclosure and, correspondingly, in public confidence in the integrity 
of the system of capital formation. The SEC report also analyzed the 
public filings of 89 corporations that had disclosed varying types of 
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questionable payments, plus six special reports obtained as the result 
of SEC enforcement actions and the allegations made in eight addi-
tional cases in which the SEC had obtained some form of judicial 
relief. Finally, the report contained the SEC's analysis of the degree 
of disclosure required concerning questionable foreign payments under 
the existing Federal securities laws and outlined the legislative and 
other responses which the Commission recommended to remedy 
these problems. 
On June 22, 1976, the committee met and ordered reported a bill, 
S. 3664, which incorporated the SEC's recommendations and a direct 
prohibition against the payment of overseas bribes by any U.S. usiness concern.1 On September 15, 1976 the Senate, by a unanimous 
vote of 86-0 passed S. 3664. The House of Representatives, however, 
did not complete work on that legislation before its adjournment on 
October 2, 1976. 
Title II of S. 305, which would amend the Federal securities laws 
to enhance the present system of disclosure of the ownership of 
American business, has also been the subject of numerous hearings 
and careful deliberation by the committee in the past. Last year, as 
part of S. 3084, the committee reported favorably 2 and the Senate 
passed the disclosure provisions as title III of S. 3084. No final action 
was taken by the Congress on this bill prior to adjournment either. 
Shortly after the 95th Congress convened on January 18, 1977, 
Senators Proxmire and Williams introduced S. 305. As introduced, 
title I of the bill was identical to S. 3664, the measure which the Senate 
had passed unanimously during the prior Congress and title II was 
substantially the same as Title II of S. 3084. 
The committee held hearings on S. 305 on March 16, 1977, and re-
ceived testimony from Senator Metealf, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the Department of the Treasury, the American Bankers 
Association, and the Securities Industry Association. Subsequently, 
on April 7, 1977, the committee met in open session to consider S. 305. 
The committee ordered the bill, with an amendment, to be reported 
to the Senate. 
SUMMARY OF THE B I L L 
A. TITLE I—CORPORATE BRIBERY OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS 
Title I of S. 305 is designed to prevent the use of corporate funds for 
corrupt purposes. As reported, Title I : 
1. Requires companies subject to the jursidiction of the SEC to 
maintain strict accounting standards and management control over 
their assets; 
2. Prohibits the falsification of accounting records and the deceit of 
accountants auditing the books and records of such companies; and 
3. Makes it a crime for U.S. companies to bribe a foreign govern-
ment official for the specified corrupt purposes. Companies violating 
the criminal prohibitions face maximum fines of $500,000. Individuals 
acting on behalf of such companies face a maximum fine of $10,000 
and 5 years in jail. 
In the past, corporate bribery has been concealed by the falsification 
of corporate books and records. Title I removes this avenue of coverup, 
reinforcing the criminal sanctions which are intended to serve as the 
1 See Senate Report No. 94-1031, 94th Cong., 2d sess. 2 See Senate Report No. 94-917, 94th Cong.. 2d sess. (1976) to accompany S. 3084, the 
Export Administration Amendments, Foreign Boycotts, and Domestic and Foreign Invest-
ments Improved Disclosure Acts of 1976. 
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significant deterrent to corporate bribery. Taken together, the account-
ing requirements and criminal prohibitions of Title I should effectively 
deter corporate bribery of foreign government officials. 
N E E D FOR LEGISLATION 
A. TITLE I—CORPORATE BRIBERY OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS 
Recent investigations by the SEC have revealed corrupt foreign 
payments by over 300 U.S. companies involving hundreds of millions 
of dollars. These revelations have had severe adverse effects. Foreign 
governments friendly to the United States in Japan, Italy, and the Netherlands have come under intense pressure from their own people. 
The image of American democracy abroad has been tarnished. Con-
fidence in the financial integrity of our corporations has been impaired. 
The efficient functioning of our capital markets has been hampered. 
Corporate bribery is bad business. In our free market system it is 
basic that the sale of products should take place on the basis of price, 
quality, and service. Corporate bribery is fundamentally destructive 
of this basic tenet. Corporate bribery of foreign officials takes place 
primarily to assist corporations in gaining business. Thus foreign 
corporate bribery affects the very stability of overseas business. 
Foreign corporate bribes also affect our domestic competitive climate 
when domestic firms engage in such practices as a substitute for 
healthy competition for foreign business. 
Managements which resort to corporate bribery and the falsifacation 
of records to enhance their business reveal a lack of confidence about 
themselves. Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal, in appearing 
before the committee in support of the criminalization of foreign 
corporate bribery testified that: "Paying bribes—apart from being 
morally repugnant and illegal in most countries—is simply not neces-
sary for the successful conduct of business here or overseas." 
The committee concurs in Secretary Blumenthal's judgment. Many 
U.S. firms have taken a strong stand against paying foreign bribes and 
are still able to compete in international trade. Unfortunately, the 
reputation and image of all U.S. businessmen has been tarnished by the 
activities of a sizable number, but by no means a majority of American 
firms. A strong antibribery law is urgently needed to bring these 
corrupt practices to a halt and to restore public confidence in the 
integrity of the American business system. 
N A T U R E OF THE LEGISLATION 
A. TITLE I—CORPORATE BRIBERY OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS 
1. Accurate accounting 
The committee recognizes that the SEC has broad authority to 
promulgate accounting standards for companies subject to jurisdiction 
under its existing authority. Nevertheless, the committee believes the 
Commission's current program for accurate accounting should be 
supplemented by an explicit statement of statutory policy. The ac-
counting standards in S. 305 are intended to operate in tandem with 
the criminalization provisions of the bill to deter corporate bribery. 
S. 305 expresses a public policy which encompasses a unified approach 
to the matter of corporate bribery. 
This legislation imposes affirmative requirements on issuers to 
maintain books and records which accurately and fairly reflect the 
transactions of the corporation and to design an adequate system of 
internal controls to assure, among other things, that the assets of the 
issuer are used for proper corporate purpose. The committee believes 
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that the imposition of these affirmative duties under our securities 
laws coupled with attendant civil liability and criminal penalties for 
failure to comply with the statutory standard will go a long way to 
prevent the use of corporate assets for corrupt purposes. Public 
confidence in securities markets will be enhanced by assurance that 
corporate recordkeeping is honest. 
Section 102 of the bill as reported amends section 13(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act by adding new paragraphs (b)(2), (b)(3), 
(b)(4), and (b)(5). The provisions of section 102 apply to issuers 
which have securities listed on an exchange pursuant to subsection 
12(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, to issuers which meet the 
requirements of section 12(g) of that Act, and to issuers subject to 
the reporting requirement of section 15(d) of the Act. 
The purpose of section 102 is to strengthen the accuracy of the 
corporate books and records and the reliability of the audit process 
which constitute the foundations of our system of corporate disclosure. 
Section 102 substantially embodies the measures which the SEC 
recommended to the committee in its May 22, 1976, report on ques-
tionable payments. New subparagraph (b)(2)(A) imposes an obliga-
tion on issuers to maintain books and records that accurately and 
fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the 
issuers.5 
Subparagraph (b)(2)(B) would require issuers to devise and main-
tain an adequate system of internal accounting controls sufficient to 
provide reasonable assurances that, among other things, transactions 
are recorded as necessary to permit the preparation of financial 
statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles 
or any other applicable criteria. Because the accounting profession 
has defined the objectives of a system of accounting control, the 
definition of the objectives contained in this subparagraph is taken 
from the authoritative accounting literature. See American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants, Statement on Auditing Standards 
No. 1, 320.28 (1973). 
The establishment and maintenance of a system of internal controls 
is an important management/obligation. A fundamental aspect of 
management's stewardship responsibility is to provide shareholders 
with reasonable assurances that the business is adequately controlled. 
Additionally, management has a responsibility to furnish shareholders 
and potential investors with reliable financial information on a timely 
basis. An adequate system of internal accounting controls is necessary 
to management's dsicharge of these obligations. 
The committee understands that auditors customarily provide 
management with comments on the state of the client's internal 
controls. Those comments are designed to assist the issuer in im-
proving its system of internal controls and thereby to assist the 
auditor in the conduct of its audit. The committee recognizes that no 
system of internal controls is perfect, and that there will always be 
room for improvement. Auditor's comments and suggestions to 
management on possible improvements are to be encouraged. 
The establishment and maintenance of a system of internal control 
and accurate books and records are fundamental responsibilities of 
management. The expected benefits to be derived from the con-
scientious discharge of these responsibilities are of basic importance to 
5 The phrase "dispositions of its assets" is not intended as a limitation on the scope of 
the requirement that accurate books and records be maintained. The issuer's responsibility 
to keep records correctly reflecting the status of its liabilities and equities is no less than 
its obligation to maintain such records concerning its assets. The word "transactions" in 
the bill encompasses accuracy in accounts of every character. 
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investors and the maintenance of the integrity of our capital market 
system. The committee recognizes, however, that management 
must exercise judgment in determining the steps to be taken, and the 
cost incurred, in giving assurance that the objectives expressed will be 
achieved. Here, standards of reasonableness must apply. In this 
regard, the term "accurately" does not mean exact precision as 
measured by some abstract principle. Rather it means that an issuer's 
records should reflect transactions in conformity with generally 
accepted accounting principles or other applicable criteria. While 
management should observe every reasonable prudence in satisfying 
the objectives called for in new paragraph (2) of section 13(b), the 
committee recognizes that management must necessarily estimate and 
evaluate the cost/benefit relationships of the steps to be taken in 
fulfillment of its responsibilities under this paragraph. The accounting 
profession will be expected to use their professional judgment in 
evaluating the systems maintained by issuers. The size of the business, 
diversity of operations, degree of centralization of financial and operat-
ing management, amount of contact by top management with day-to-
day operations, and numerous other circumstances are factors which 
management must consider in establishing and maintaining an 
internal accounting controls system. 
2. Prohibition against falsification of accounting records and deception 
of auditors 
Paragraph (b)(3) would make it unlawful for any person, directly 
or indirectly, knowingly to falsify any book, record or account main-
tained, or required to be maintained, for an accounting purpose of an 
issuer subject to paragraph (b)(2) of section 13 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. This paragraph covers both actions of com-
mission and omission. 
Paragraph (b)(4) would prohibit knowingly making false or mis-
leading statements, or knowingly omitting to state facts necessary to 
be stated, to an accountant in connection with any audit or examina-
tion of issuers identified in paragraph (b)(2) of section 13 of the 
Securities Exchange Act. This paragraph would also apply to audits 
in connection with a securities offering registered or to be registered 
under the Securities Act of 1933. Concepts of aiding and abetting are 
applicable to conduct covered by these sections. By specifically pro-
hibiting the making of knowingly materially false or misleading state-
ments or omissions to auditors, the bill is designed to encourage 
careful communications between the auditors and persons from whom 
the auditors seek information in the audit process. The committee is 
of the view that a proscription on knowing false statements to auditors 
will enhance the integrity of the auditing process. 
The amendments to section 13(b) prohibiting the falsification of 
corporate books and records and the making of misleading representa-
tions to auditors are not intended to make unlawful conduct which 
is merely negligent. To clarify the purpose of these paragraphs, 
therefore, the committee inserted the term "knowingly" in appropriate 
places in both paragraphs (3) and (4). As explained to the committee, 
the term "knowingly" connotes a "conscious undertaking." Thus 
these paragraphs proscribe and make unlawful conduct which is 
rooted in a conscious undertaking to falsify records or mislead auditors 
through a statement or conscious omission of material facts. 
The committee believes that the inclusion of the "knowingly" 
standard is appropriate because of the danger, inherent in matters 
relating to financial recordkeeping, that inadvertent misstatements 
or minor discrepancies arising from an unwitting error in judgment 
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might be deemed actionable. The committee does not, however, intend 
that the use of the terming "knowingly" will provide a defense for 
those who shield themselves from the facts. The knowledge required 
is that the defendant be aware that he is committing the act which 
is false—not that he know that his conduct is illegal. The inclusion of 
this standard is intended to be limited to matters arising under these 
new subsections and not to any other provisions of the securities laws. 
As a result, in this limited instance, in order to prove that falsifica-
tion of corporate accounting records or deception of auditors is 
"knowingly" committed, the Commission will be required to establish 
this element in actions arising under new paragraphs 13(b)(3) and 
13(b)(4). 
The knowledge required is that the person be aware that he is or 
may be making a false statement or causing corporate records to be 
falsified through a conscious undertaking or due to his conscious 
disregard for the truth. 
The bill, as reported, would also permit the head of any agency or 
department responsible for national security matters to exempt, on a 
limited basis, an issuer involved in an endeavor related to national 
security from the accounting and reporting requirements of the bill. 
The facts and circumstances to which the directive applies must be 
reported to the President. 
3. Criminalization of foreign bribery 
The committee recognizes that the SEC has diligently sought to 
enforce the existing provisions of the Federal securities laws by re-
quiring corporate reports to disclose "material" payments. Neverthe-
less, the committee has concluded that—"The serious abuses which 
the Commission has uncovered justify an explicit congressional 
affirmation of our national commitment of ending corrupt foreign 
payments. While the Commission has made substantial progress in 
its enforcement program, the committee believes that legislation is 
appropriate to make clear that cessation of these abuses is a matter, 
not merely of SEC concern, but of national policy." 
Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal supported the criminalization 
of overseas bribery in testimony before the committee. The committee 
considered the matter extensively in the 94th Congress and concluded 
that the criminalization approach was preferred over a disclosure 
approach. Direct criminalization entails no reporting burden on 
corporations and less of an enforcement burden on the Government. 
The criminalization of foreign corporate bribery will to a significant 
extent act as a self-enforcing, preventative mechanism. 
Sections 103 and 104 of the bill provide criminal penalties for 
foreign corporate bribery. Section 103 applies to issuers and reporting 
firms under the jurisdiction of the SEC. Section 104 applies to all 
other domestic concerns. Under sections 103 and 104, a corporation is 
prohibited from making payments to a foreign official for the purpose 
of inducing him to obtain or retain business for the corporation or to 
influence legislation or regulations of the Government. 
Payment to officials of a foreign political office having the purposes 
set forth respecting payments to foreign government officials are like-
wise proscribed. And payments to agents, while knowing or having 
reason to know, that all or a portion of the payment will be offered or 
given to a foreign government official, foreign political party or 
candidate for foreign political office for the proscribed purposes are 
also forbidden. 
The statute covers payments made to foreign officials for the pur-
pose of obtaining business or influencing legislation or regulations. The 
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statute does not, therefore, cover so-called "grease payments" such as 
payments for expediting shipments through customs or placing a 
transatlantic telephone call, securing required permits, or obtaining 
adequate police protection, transactions which may involve even 
the proper performance of duties. 
The word "corruptly" is used in order to make clear that the offer, 
payment, promise, or gift, must be intended to induce the recipient to 
misuse his official position in order to wrongfully direct business to the 
payor or his client, or to obtain preferential legislation or a favorable 
regulation. The word "corruptly" connotes an evil motive or purpose, 
an intent to wrongfully influence the recipient. I t does not require 
that the act be fully consummated, or succeed in producing the 
desired outcome. 
Sections 103 and 104 cover payments and gifts intended to influence 
the recipient, regardless of who first suggested the payment or gift. 
The defense that the payment was demanded on the part of a govern-
ment official as a price for gaining entry into a market or to obtain a 
contract would not suffice since at some point the U.S. company 
would make a conscious decision whether or not to pay a bribe. That 
the payment may have been first proposed by the recipient rather 
than the U.S. company does not alter the corrupt purpose on the 
part of the person paying the bribe. On the other hand true extortion 
situations would not be covered by this provision since a payment to an 
official to keep an oil rig from being dynamited should not be held to 
be made with the requisite corrupt purpose. 
Section 305 as reported also covers the officers, directors, employees, 
or stockholders making overseas bribes on behalf of the corporation. 
This provision is intended to make clear that it is corporate or business 
bribery which is being proscribed. Whether or not a particular situa-
tion involves b r ibe ry by the corporation or by an individual acting 
on his own will depend on all the facts and circumstances, including 
the position of the employee, the care with which the board of direc-
tors supervises management, the care with which management super-
vises employees in sensitive positions and its adherence to the strict 
accounting standards set forth under section 102. The prohibitions 
against corrupt payments apply in this regard to payments by agents 
where the corporation paying them knew or had reason to know they 
would be passed on in whole or in part to a foreign government official 
for a proscribed purpose. Of course, where the corporation knows 
the payment will be passed on for a proscribed purpose, the violation 
is complete. 
The committee has recognized that the bill would not reach all 
corrupt overseas payments. For example, the bill would not cover pay-
ments by foreign nationals acting solely on behalf of foreign sub-
sidiaries where there is no nexus with U.S. interstate commerce or the 
use of U.S. mails and where the issuer, reporting company, or domestic 
concern had no knowledge of the payment. But a U.S. company 
which "looks the other way" in order to be able to raise the defense 
that they were ignorant of bribes made by a foreign subsidiary, could 
be in violation of section 102 requiring companies to devise and main-
tain adequate accounting controls. Under the accounting section no 
off-the-books accounting fund could be lawfully maintained, either 
by a U.S. parent or by a foreign subsidiary, and no improper payment 
could be lawfully disguised. 
Enforcement responsibilities 
After careful consideration the committee concluded that the SEC 
should continue to have a role in the investigation of violations of the 
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criminal prohibitions as they apply to companies under the jurisdiction 
of the SEC. The SEC has been the principal agency of the Govern-
ment taking the lead in the investigation of foreign bribery. This is 
as it should be for the bribery of foreign officials often violates our 
securities laws to the extent the payment is not disclosed to investors. 
The SEC has thus developed considerable expertise in investigation 
corrupt overseas payments. This same expertise can be put to work 
in investigating potential violations of the antibribery provisions of 
this legislation. If this investigative responsibility were to be assigned 
solely to the Justice Department, as some had advocated, that agency 
would have to duplicate the investigative capability already in the 
SEC at a greater cost to the Government. 
I t should be emphasized that while the SEC investigates potential 
violations of the securities laws, the only remedy it can bring on its 
own is an injunctive action. When the SEC believes it has compiled 
enough evidence for a criminal action, it refers the case to the Justice 
Department for criminal prosecution. This same division of responsi-
bility would also apply with respect to the antibribery provisions of 
this legislation. 
The committee believes this division of responsibility will result in a 
stronger enforcement effort compared to an exclusive assignment to 
the Justice Department. I t is often difficult to assemble the degree of 
evidence required in a criminal action, but enough evidence may exist 
to enable the SEC to halt a continuation of the corrupt practices 
through an injunctive action. 
The committee expects that close cooperation will develop between 
the SEC and the Justice Department at the earliest stage of any 
investigation in order to insure that the evidence needed for a criminal 
prosecution does not become stale. The arrangements which the com-
mittee expects the SEC and Justice to work out on criminal matters is 
in no way intended to cast doubt upon the authority of the SEC to 
prosecute and defend its own civil litigation. Under the bill, the Justice 
Department retains sole investigative and prosecutional jurisdiction 
over domestic concerns covered but which are not otherwise within the 
jurisdiction of the SEC. 
The committee believes that, by assigning to the SEC enforcement 
responsibilities for the new prohibition, it will strengthen the Com-
mission's ability to enforce compliance with the existing reguirements 
of the securities laws, and with the new accounting provisions recom-
mended by the Commission and included as section 102 of the bill. 
Obviously, there may be practical impediments to enforcement in 
individual cases, just as proof of bribery and other white collar crimes 
is often difficult to obtain in domestic cases. Nonetheless, the Commis-
sion's enforcement efforts under existing U.S. law demonstrate that it 
is entirely feasible for U.S. agencies successfully to investigate im-
proper foreign payments made on behalf of American corporations. 
The SEC's responsibilities would extend to conducting investiga-
tions, bringing civil injunctive actions, commencing administrative 
proceedings if appropriate,6 defending lawsuits against the Commission 
and its staff arising out of the Commission's obligations under this Act, 
and referring cases to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution 
on a timely basis. The Commission, of course, will retain all of its exist-
ing remedies under the securities laws, and the committee anticipates 
6 For example, rule 2(e) of the Commission's rules of practice, 17 CFR 201.2(e), 
authorizes the Commission to censure, suspend, or bar professionals, such as accountants 
and lawyers, from practicing before the Commission. A public or private rule 2(e) pro-
ceeding might, in the Commission's view, be preferable, or used in addition to a civil 
injunctive action or criminal referral, in particular cases. 
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that the Commission will continue to tailor remedies to fit the circum-
stances of specific cases. 
SECTION-BY-SECTION A N A L Y S I S 
The purpose of this legislation would be accomplished by amending 
existing sections 13(b), 13(d), 15(d), and 32(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 ("the act") and by adding new sections 13(g), 
13(h), and new section 30A, to the act. Further, a new provision would 
be added to the criminal code. 
A. TITLE I — F O R E I G N CORRUPT PRACTICES 
Short title 
Section 101. This title may be cited as the "Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977." 
Integrity of accounting records and reports 
Section 102 of the bill would amend section 13 of the Exchange 
Act by renumbering existing subsection (b) as (b)(1) and by adding 
four new paragraphs. New paragraph 13(b)(2) would apply only 
to issuers which have a class of securities registered pursuant to section 
12 of the act and issuers required to file reports pursuant to section 
15(d) of the act ("reporting companies"). I t would require reporting 
companies to make and keep books, records, and accounts which 
accurately and fairly reflect all of their transactions and dispositions 
of assets. 
A reporting company also would be required to establish and main-
tain an adequate system of internal accounting controls sufficient 
to provide reasonable assurances that: 
(1) Transactions are executed in accordance with management 
directions; 
(2) Transactions are recorded in a manner that permits the 
company to prepare its financial statements in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles or other applicable 
criteria and to maintain accountability for its assets; 
(3) Access to company assets is permitted only in accordance 
with management authorization; and 
(4) The recorded accountability for assets is compared with 
existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is 
taken with respect to differences. 
New Paragraph (3) would make it unlawful for any person know-
ingly to falsify or cause to be falsified any book, record, or account 
of a reporting company which has been made or is required to be made 
for any accounting purpose. 
New paragraph (4) would make it unlawful for any person know-
ingly to make or cause to be made a materially false or misleading 
statement or to omit to state or cause another person to omit to state 
any material fact necessary in order to make statements to an account-
ant not misleading. This paragraph would apply to statements made 
to an accountant in connection with any examination or audit of an 
issuer with securities registered or to be registered under the Securities 
Act of 1933, as well as any examination or audit of a reporting company. 
New paragraph (5) would provide that no duty or liability could be 
imposed under new paragraphs (2), (3), or (4) upon any person acting 
pursuant to a written directive of the head of an agency responsible 
for national security. This exclusion only applies, however, to the 
extent that the requirements of new paragraphs (2), (3), or (4) would 
be likely to result in the disclosure of properly classified national 
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security information. Every directive executed by a national security 
agency head under this paragraph would have to describe specifically 
the facts which are not to be disclosed and the surrounding circum-
stances. These directives would expire annually unless renewed in 
writing. Agency heads would maintain a file of these directives, and 
each year on October 1 all directives in force during the prior year 
would have to be transmitted to the President for his review and 
certification that all conformed to law. 
Prohibition against certain payments to officials by registered companies 
Section 103 of the bill would add a new section 30A to the Act to 
prohibit any reporting company, or any officer, director, or employee, 
or shareholder acting on behalf of such a company, to use the mails 
or the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce corruptly 
in furtherance of an offer, payment, or promise to pay, or authorization 
of the payment of, any money, or offer, gift, or promise to give any-
thing of value, to three classes of persons : 
(1) An official of a foreign government or instrumentality of a 
foreign government, 
(2) A foreign political party or an official of a foreign political party, 
or a candidate for a foreign political office, or 
(3) Any other person while the issuer knows or has reason to know 
that money or a gift will be offered, promised or given to an official 
of a foreign political party, or a candidate for a foreign political office. 
The scope of section 30A is limited by the requirement that the offer, 
promise, authorization, payment, or gift must have as a purpose 
inducing the recipient to use influence with the foreign government 
or instrumentality, or to refrain from performing any official responsi-
bilities, so as to direct business to any person, maintain an established 
business opportunity with any person, divert any business opportunity 
from any person or influence the enactment or promulgation of legis-
lation or regulations of that government or instrumentality. 
Prohibition against certain payments to officials by other domestic concerns 
Section 104 of the bill would prohibit persons included in the defini-
tion of the term "domestic concern" who would not be covered by 
new section 30A of the Act from engaging in any of the same types of 
conduct prohibited by that section. 
The term "domestic concern" is defined in the bill to mean an 
individual who is a citizen or national of the United States as well as 
any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, busi-
ness trust, or unincorporated organization which is owned or controlled 
by individuals who are citizens or nationals of the United States and 
which has its principal place of business in the United States or any 
territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States. 
The term "interstate commerce" is defined to mean trade, commerce, 
transportation, or communication among the several States, or be-
tween any foreign country and any State or between any State and 
any place or ship on trade thereof. The term includes the interstate 
use of a telephone or other interstate means of communication and 
the intrastate use of any other interstate instrumentality. 
The penalties for each violation of section 103 or section 104 would 
be a fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment for up to 5 years, or both, 
but in the case of a corporation a fine of up to $500,000 could be 
imposed. 
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